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O Nature, and O soul of man! 
How far beyond all utterance 
Are your linked analogies! 
 
Herman Melville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This one’s going out to all sentient beings! 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
SALUTATION 
 
 
 
 Welcome, friends.  I salute you.  I am truly grateful for your participation in this project.  
May all beings benefit from our endeavor! 
 William James opens his Gifford Lectures, collected in his Varieties of Religious 
Experience, with the words: “It is with no small amount of trepidation that I take my place 
behind this desk, and face this learned audience…it begets a certain sense of apology being due 
for so presumptuous an act.”  James is one of the first philosophers that I encountered in my 
studies, and it has been some time since I first read these words.  I remember them now, 
however, as I sit here feeling much the same sentiment. 
 Taking my lead from Socrates, what I have in mind to discuss is no small matter, but how 
we should live.  It turns out that answering this question well requires answering many others.  
Indeed, it turns out that answering this question well requires, in the end, a whole system of 
philosophy.  Or so it seems to me.  Ideally, we should base our answer to this primordial 
question on nothing less than a complete understanding of reality just as it is.  Short of this, we 
should at least do the best that we can, according to our capabilities, to deepen our appreciation 
of the nature of reality and the significance of life. 
 The magnitude of the task that we have before us is considerable, and the act of taking it 
up is, perhaps, more than a little presumptuous.  It is, in any event, more than a little daunting.  
For this reason, I have labored long in preparation for this work.  In this way, I am in sympathy 
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with Descartes, who, in the first paragraph of his First Meditation, says: “…the task looked an 
enormous one, and I began to wait until I should reach a mature enough age to ensure that no 
subsequent time of life would be more suitable for tackling such inquiries.  This led me to put the 
project off for so long that I would now be to blame if by pondering over it any further I wasted 
the time still left for carrying it out.”  Presumptuous though it may be, it would seem a shame to 
die without first sharing something of what I have learned. 
 So, what I have to offer is a system of philosophy.  In announcing this, I recall 
Santayana’s opening words to his Scepticism and Animal Faith: “Here is one more system of 
philosophy.  If the reader is tempted to smile, I can assure him that I smile with him…”  
Santayana says that his system differs significantly, in both its pretensions and approach, from 
what readers are liable to associate with this designation.  Need I say more?  Later, I shall say 
more.  For now, these words can speak for themselves. 
 Much of what I have to say has already been said.  Of course, this remark, too, has 
already been said.  Santayana insists that his system is neither his, nor new.  Royce notes the 
difficulty of saying anything true in philosophy that has not been said before.  This does not 
worry me much.  I seek truth more than novelty.  But maybe I shall at least say things in a new 
way, and in a way that reaches people that have not been reached before.  After all, Emerson has 
taught us that each generation needs its own books. 
 Why bother with such an undertaking, especially given the laborious and sometimes 
tedious character of its execution?  We just noted the connection between understanding reality 
and knowing how best to live.  But we can say more, for why should we care about knowing 
how best to live?  We care about knowing how best to live because life—at least in its ordinary 
mode—is difficult.  Schopenhauer remarks that were it not for suffering and death, perhaps the 
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thought of philosophizing would never even occur to us.  But we do suffer.  And we do face 
death.  It is also true that we can be happy, and find great meaning and significance in life.  And 
all this applies, not only to each of us individually, but to all of us together.  In other words, we 
have not only our own good but also the good of others to consider.  The stakes, then, are high; 
heroic efforts are justified.  As Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal, one of my Tibetan teachers, has said: 
“Without the trouble and difficulties, the title of hero or heroine won’t come.” 
 Of course, the present fashion in philosophy tends more toward close technical work.  I 
am grateful for this work—my own work depends upon it.  But broader, more systematic work is 
also useful.  Indeed, the narrower, more focused work gains meaning and significance from 
larger contexts.  Broad systematic work may be difficult, but difficult need not mean impossible.  
In any event, even small successes can be useful.  Therefore, let us not be deterred from our task, 
however monumental it may be. 
 Perhaps skeptical doubts remain concerning the viability of this project, or indeed, of any 
such project.  Well they should.  But they should not unduly constrain us.  Hegel speaks well 
when he indicates that undue fear of error is itself an error.  No doubt, Hegel, at times, presumes 
too much.  This too is an error.  Kierkegaard, in his Journals, captures this latter point nicely: “If 
Hegel had written the whole of his logic and then said, in the preface, that it was merely an 
experiment in thought in which he had even begged the question in many places, then he would 
certainly have been the greatest thinker who had ever lived.  As it is he is merely comic.” 
 Let us not make this latter mistake.  But let us go forth boldly, nonetheless.  As James 
further says, in the place with which we began: “The academic career also has its heroic 
obligations, so I stand here without further deprecatory words.” 
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 Again, my sincere thanks to those who have gone before, most particularly to my own 
precious teachers, you who read this now. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 I have spoken, so far, in very general terms concerning the nature and aim of our project.  
In his Preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel talks of the inadequacies that attend 
attempts to preface philosophical works, saying, among other things, “…the real issue is not 
exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but 
rather the result together with the process through which it came about.”1  This consideration 
suggests that I have already said enough, that further preparatory remarks would be superfluous.  
But Hegel is prone to excess, and although there is surely a good measure of truth in this point, I 
think that a few further prefatory remarks will be helpful. 
 What is to be the central topic of our discourse?  As announced in the title, it is to be the 
totality, the individual, and their relation.  We say also that this is to be a study of the nature of 
reality and the significance of life.  Why should a work with this latter intention bear the title that 
it does?  Why the totality, the individual, and their relation? 
 Any project must begin with existing materials.  This is as true of philosophy as it is of 
other activities and endeavors.  Philosophy is, at least in one of its aspects, a discursive practice, 
whether in dialogue or soliloquy.  In this mode, philosophy works with concepts.  If we are to 
speak with others—indeed, if we are even to think, in the ordinary sense of thinking—we cannot 
do without at least some of these concepts.  The totality, the individual, and their relation are, as 
                                                
1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface. 
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notions, the landmark concepts of our system; they are signposts from which we begin and to 
which we recur.  Indeed, these notions, after some interpretation and development, retain their 
usefulness to the end.  We identify these as landmark concepts because they are of pivotal 
significance in our endeavor to understand reality and our place within it.  Moreover, they set a 
frame for other notions that we find useful, both theoretically and practically. 
 The totality, in the most general and abstract sense of the term, is simply the whole of 
reality, the whole of all that there is.  In this sense of the term, there is, so far, no implication 
concerning the nature of the totality—no implication, for instance, as to whether the totality is a 
simple unity, an organic whole, or an abstract collection merely conceptually united.  Why 
should we take the notion of the totality to be a landmark concept?  The totality is the limit in the 
direction of inclusiveness.  Among other things, our use of this term signals that we intend to 
speak of reality in a comprehensive fashion.  However, as we develop our understanding of the 
totality as a concrete reality, implications of a more momentous character will be evident. 
 The individual, in the most general and abstract sense of the term, is anything that is 
supposed to be at least nominally a unit.  In this sense of the term, there is, so far, no implication 
concerning the nature of the individual—no implication, for instance, as to whether the 
individual is an atomic unit, an organic whole, or a sort of aggregate only nominally unitary.  
Why should we take the notion of the individual to be a landmark concept?  According to 
atomistic views of individuality, the individual is the limit in the direction of division.  More 
broadly, the notion of the individual typically includes supposed particular things—both subjects 
and objects—things that are supposed to be, if not indivisible, at least in some significant sense 
unitary.  According to a common interpretation of the nature of reality, it is these things—these 
individuals—that “make up” the world. 
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 The notion of the individual is a very natural—that is to say, habitual—element of our 
thinking.  Even so, the notion of the individual is problematic.  The individual is, whatever else it 
may be, a pivotal category, a category of great significance both theoretically and practically.  In 
particular, the notion of the human individual—or, more broadly, the notion of the animal 
individual—is a crucial ethical and political notion.  We say also that the animal individual is, in 
an important sense, real—that is, the animal individual is not a merely conceptual entity.  The 
positive sense in which we affirm the reality of the individual will be revealed in the sequel.  For 
now, let us just say that, for the most part, the true nature and ontological status of the individual 
is badly misunderstood.  This misunderstanding is at least as prevalent among philosophers as it 
is among ordinary people.  Importantly, this misunderstanding yields pernicious consequences, 
both individually and socially.  Therefore, unraveling the difficulties associated with the notion 
of the individual, and coming to better know the individual as such, are among the principal tasks 
of this treatise. 
 A relation, in the most general and abstract sense of the term, is any connection existing 
among supposed things.  In this sense of the term, there is, so far, no implication concerning the 
nature of a relation—no implication, for instance, as to whether a relation is internal, external, 
both, or neither.  Why should we take the notion of a relation to be a landmark concept?  The 
notion of a relation ordinarily—some would say necessarily—implies relata, things that stand in 
relation.2  It is commonly supposed that relata are, in some important sense, prior to their 
relations (not insofar as they are relata, but insofar as they are things).  That is, relata are 
supposed to be independent of the relations in which they—thus contingently—stand.  On the 
other side, one might suppose that relations are prior to relata; one might suppose, for instance, 
that relations are real while supposed relata are simply conceptual constructions.  Although this 
                                                
2 Cf. the Buddhist notion of the three spheres: subject, object, and the action between them. 
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side may seem more difficult to sustain, in truth, both sides are defective extremes.  Even so, 
both sides have their truth.3 
 Evidently, the notion of a relation is just as problematic as the notion of the individual.  
This should not be surprising, for the two notions are part of the same strategy for describing 
reality, and are, in this sense, correlative and mutually dependent.  For this reason, an 
understanding of either requires an understanding of the other, requires an understanding of both. 
Therefore, like the notion of the individual, the notion of a relation is a landmark concept of our 
system.  With respect to the title of our treatise, by their relation, we mean, together, the relation 
of the totality to the individual, the relation of the individual to the totality, and the relation of the 
various individuals to one another. 
*   *   * 
 How should the dissertation be structured?  Should each of the landmark concepts just 
adumbrated be afforded its own major division?  No, this would not be useful, for there is little 
that can productively be said of any one of them without reference to the others.  The totality, the 
individual, and their relation cannot be understood in isolation from one another, for they do not 
exist in isolation from one another.  What, then, should be the order of treatment?  This is a 
challenge that afflicts systematic work generally: a plexus of interrelated ideas must somehow be 
reduced to a linearly arranged text.  Here I am reminded of Schopenhauer’s insistence that his 
oeuvre must be read at least twice to be understood.  Schopenhauer’s supercilious demand 
notwithstanding, the problem of composition remains.4 
 We will be treating issues that have traditionally been classed under the rubric of 
metaphysics.  There are several reasons why the term ‘metaphysics’ might not be the best 
                                                
3 I here recall William James’ illustration of the man, the squirrel, and the tree.  The man goes round the squirrel, 
and he does not, depending upon which sense of “goes round” is in play. 
4 Beethoven’s 9th Symphony is a fine example of structure, something worthy of emulation. 
 13 
designation for our work here.  For one, metaphysics continues to have something of a bad name 
in certain circles.  For another, and more importantly, this title is liable to give a mistaken 
impression, to some, of the nature of its content and the character of its execution.  By 
metaphysics, I mean something rather broad and systematic, not a mere laundry list of technical 
difficulties and piecemeal analyses.  Shall we call it instead general science?  For it is the science 
of reality in its most general aspects.  Or we could simply refer to it as systematic philosophy, for 
it is systematic philosophy in one of its aspects.  These and other names are possible, and not 
without their respective merit.  I here retain the expression ‘metaphysics’, hoping to recover 
something of its ancestral meaning and significance.  But let it be known that I eschew the 
perversions with which the practice has come to be associated in the opinions of the analysts.  
Metaphysics, to the extent to which it is useful, is empirically grounded.  It is not empty 
apriorism.  It is concerned with the basis of reality and the nature of reality, and with the 
application of these things to such practical considerations as ethics, politics, and the meaning of 
life.  Although the term is no longer current, perhaps a better designation would be natural 
philosophy. 
 What is to be the subject of metaphysics?  Reality itself, generally considered.  As just 
explained, the most general concepts (excepting the concept of reality itself) that we find useful 
to apply to reality are the totality, the individual, and their relation.  To say much more, on this 
occasion, would be to say too much.  Still, a brief indication of some of the key issues with 
which we shall be involved does not seem out of place. 
 In speaking of what he calls the ancient problem of the one and the many, William James, 
in the fourth lecture of his Pragmatism, says:  “I myself have come, by long brooding over it, to 
consider it the most central of all philosophical problems, central because so pregnant.”  And: 
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“To believe in the one or in the many, that is the classification with the maximum number of 
consequences.”  James later adds, in the eighth lecture of the same set: “We stand here before the 
final question of philosophy…the deepest and most pregnant question that our minds can frame.”  
Much of the spirited and illuminating dialogue between James and his friend and colleague 
Josiah Royce turns on this very issue, an issue that is indeed of ancient origin.  Harking back, in 
the West, at least as far as Heraclitus and Parmenides, the issue finds expression also in the 
teachings of the ancient sages of India, China, and Tibet (Nagarjuna, Shankara, and 
Shantarakshita are of special use to us in this connection).  The issue remains a challenge even 
unto our own time.  A couple of years subsequent to the just-quoted remarks, James confesses, in 
the third lecture of A Pluralistic Universe: “…the whole business remains a puzzle, both 
intellectually and morally.”  The resolution of this longstanding and persistent difficulty is one of 
the results of our work.  (Foreshadowing, we reject the exclusive disjunction implicit in James’s 
second remark above, finding truth in both monism and pluralism, and, in their usual 
formulations, inadequacies as well.) 
 A second key issue to which we give attention is the problem of being and becoming.  
This issue is closely related, in both its basis and its ancestry, to the problem of the one and the 
many, and is of comparable significance (Plato and Aristotle are both noteworthy in this 
connection).  This difficulty, also, finds resolution in our system, one of the pivotal components 
of which is a new theory of the nature of time.  Time, like the individual, tends to be badly 
misunderstood.  That there is this correlation is to be expected, for the two notions work in 
concert, and a mistaken conception of the one tends toward a mistaken conception of the other.  
Consider, as an illustration of the interplay of these two notions, the problem of personal identity.  
The problem of personal identity is just a special case of the more general problem of individual 
 15 
identity.  The problematic character of this problem, in its most acute expression, is a 
consequence of the difficulty of accounting for supposed individual identity through time.  An 
understanding of the animal individual, an understanding of any temporal individual, requires an 
understanding of the nature of time.  Just so, an understanding of the nature of time is required 
for an understanding of movement and change.  Therefore, our theory of time is, in a measure, 
the linchpin of our system: for the person to whom the nature of time is clear, everything 
becomes clear; for the person to whom the nature of time is not clear, nothing becomes clear.  
(As I have explained elsewhere, time has no independent reality, but is simply the order of 
dependence of reality itself.  Time is, therefore, a kind of relation.  The temporal and the eternal 
are one: they are both real, but they are not distinct realms.  Both being and becoming have their 
truth.  Why there is something rather than nothing is understood.) 
 A third key issue to be considered pertains to the basic nature of the ground of reality.  It 
is hard even to name this issue without prejudicing the case or evincing a kind of partisanship.  
There is, in ordinary thought and speech, a common distinction between the mental and the 
physical.  This distinction is apparently useful enough, as evidenced by its widespread use.  
Nonetheless, it can be a source of delusion.  Upon this pedestrian distinction are founded such 
familiar and influential metaphysical doctrines as idealism, materialism, and dualism.  Each of 
these orientations involves a claim concerning the fundamental character of reality, and each 
must confront the challenge of explaining the relation of the mental and the physical on this 
basis.  Some of the most extraordinary and extravagant theories in the history of philosophy have 
been framed to this end, including illusionism, eliminativism, and parallelism.  In interpreting the 
mental and the physical as different attributes of one substance, Spinoza comes closer to the 
truth.  With a nod to Spinoza, Royce—although in the main a champion of a version of 
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idealism—sometimes points to double-aspect theory, and he too is on the right track.  (Although 
we take inspiration from Spinoza with respect to the present issue, we find fault with his 
handling of the previous two key issues.  In particular, we reject Spinoza’s strict determinism 
and his essentialism with regard to the individual.) 
 There are other significant issues to be addressed within the scope of metaphysics and 
natural philosophy, including causation or dependent origination, as well as a multitude of 
subordinate issues.  Their enumeration and discussion will wait for the treatise itself, however; I 
presume that I have already said enough to indicate the character and direction of our 
undertaking.  It is likely to be evident by now that ours is a sort of middle-way philosophy, a 
philosophy with practical groundings, practical intentions, and practical results.  In speaking of a 
middle way, however, we do not mean some merely intermediate position.  We do not mean a 
simple compromise.  What we accomplish is more on the order of a synthesis, but even this 
notion does not really do justice to our approach and results.  Even so, we seek to avoid the 
defective extremes to which others have fallen in the past. 
 In the sphere of metaphysics, the extreme view on the side of the totality, or the one, is 
simple monism (Parmenides and Shankara exemplify this position, at least as they are popularly 
interpreted).  The extreme view on the side of the individual, or the many, is atomistic pluralism 
(Democritus, 19th Century physics, and those with an atomic notion of the animal individual 
exemplify this position).  Meanwhile, an extreme view on the side of being is eternalism (in its 
block-universe variety,5 and an extreme view on the side of becoming is presentism (in its simple 
expression).6  Since these are defective extremes, we reject both simple eternalism and simple 
presentism.  Nevertheless, we retain the truth of both in our middle way.  Just so, we affirm the 
                                                
5 Related to the so-called static theory of time. 
6 Related to the so-called dynamic theory of time. 
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reality of both the one and the many, of both being and becoming, of both the mental and the 
physical.  Of course, in merely issuing brief slogans, one cannot reasonably expect to be 
understood.  The meaning of these proclamations remains to be interpreted. 
 Perhaps, despite all the talk so far of the individual, someone still supposes that we do not 
afford genuine reality to individuals, and that this defect yields pernicious consequences.  For 
have we not already suggested that things commonly taken to be concrete individuals are, in 
truth, mere abstractions, hypostatized or reified without our notice?  And might this suggestion 
not justify the abuse of individuals, such abuse as is unfortunately already instantiated in fact?  
Should anyone have this concern with reference to our system, let us attempt, very briefly here, 
to assuage it, even though a more satisfactory response must await the complete work. 
 In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard observes: “Each age has its own 
characteristic depravity.  Ours is perhaps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but rather a 
dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual man.”7  To Kierkegaard, no one better 
exemplifies this depravity, this dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual, than does 
Hegel.  Is this fair?  In the concluding paragraph of his Preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel says: “…the share in the total work of Spirit which falls to the individual can only be very 
small.”8  Therefore, thinks Hegel, the individual should expect little in return.  In the grand 
dialectic of Spirit, the individual is more means than end, and is fittingly sacrificed upon the 
slaughter-bench of history.  This assessment of the role and value of the individual does indeed 
stand in stark contrast to that of Kierkegaard, who accords the individual paramount status.  In 
“The Insignificance of Individuals”, John Lachs identifies the notion of impersonal subjectivity 
as the root cause of the disdain for the individual that pervades much of German idealism, 
                                                
7 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
8 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface. 
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especially the work of Fichte and Hegel.9  Lachs there contrasts this orientation, not with 
Kierkegaard, but with several classical figures in American philosophy. 
 Can Kierkegaard and Hegel be reconciled?  Perhaps not.  But they do each have a share 
of truth.  If they cannot be reconciled, it is because neither grasps the full truth.  Hegel is correct 
in recognizing the significance of the whole, but fails to realize the true nature and identity of the 
whole, giving undue weight and emphasis to the state.  Kierkegaard is correct is recognizing the 
significance of the individual, but misconceives the individual and its relation to the whole, 
erroneously supposing the individual to be atomic and giving undue credence to dualistic theism.  
They both furnish useful insights, and we learn from their mistakes.  Therefore, even if the two 
cannot be reconciled, we can preserve the truth of both in our middle way. 
 Does this indication that we preserve the truth of Kierkegaard, or, more broadly, that we 
recognize and embrace the significance of the individual, go any way toward alleviating the 
aforementioned worry that our system might not accord genuine reality to individuals?  Perhaps 
not.  In any event, let us leave the matter for now with this concluding statement, which is, 
perhaps, only suggestive: Although we do deny the existence of individuals in the sense of 
enduring atomic substances (Aristotle’s primary substances, Indian philosophy’s svabhava), we 
nonetheless affirm the reality of individuals, properly understood.  Therefore, in showing that 
what are often supposed to be concrete individuals are, in fact, mere abstractions, the truth of the 
individual is not denied but revealed.  At issue in this connection is a case of what Whitehead 
calls the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.10  It is not that the individual is not real; it is that 
what is commonly taken to be concrete is not.  Although Whitehead identifies this fallacy and 
correctly sees it as an important source of difficulty, in endorsing a sort of atomism, he 
                                                
9 John Lachs, “The Insignificance of Individuals”. 
10 Whitehead, Process and Reality. 
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nonetheless himself falls victim to it.  Such bottom-up approaches are all defective extremes.  
Again, we chart a middle way. 
 And what shall we say of the totality?  Is the totality a simple unity, an organic whole, an 
abstract collection merely conceptually united, or what?  Or should we simply wag our finger? 
 Perhaps there are totally independent realms of being.  If so, then the totality of all such 
realms is only an abstract collection, for there is, in this case, no actual integration of parts, no 
actual unity beyond that which one might suppose to attend the conceptual collection itself.  This 
abstract object, if so one pleased to call it, is not the target of our investigation.  Our concern here 
is with the totality of this realm, the one that we inhabit.  If there are other realms of being that 
are totally independent from this one, they can have no impact on us or anything else in this 
realm, nor can we have any impact on them.  We can only wish them well. 
 Another point of clarification: In speaking of the totality, we mean not merely the totality 
of everything that one might suppose to exist at some particular moment of time, but rather, the 
whole of all that there is, the whole of reality, for all time.  For emphasis, I shall sometimes 
speak of this as the transtemporal totality.  In truth, however, this appellation is something of a 
redundancy, for this is the only concrete totality that there can be.  Insofar as it makes sense at all 
to speak of a totality in the former sense (in the sense of the totality of everything that one might 
suppose to exist at some particular moment of time), what is named in this instance is merely an 
abstract notion.  One of the reasons that this is so takes some time to explain, involving, as it 
does, Einstein’s teaching on the relativity of simultaneity.  However, in the limited space here, 
we can say this: If, in supposing a moment of time, one is supposing a mathematical instant, then 
what is involved is a mere hypothetical slice through reality, not a concrete portion of reality.  
So, the supposed totality in question is merely an abstract notion.  If, instead of this, some non-
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infinitesimal spread of time is supposed to be included in the so-called moment, then the duration 
and boundaries of this spread can only be arbitrarily established.  Again, anything supposed to be 
named in this instance would be a mere abstraction (although it could be said to have concrete 
content were it not for the matter of the relativity of simultaneity).  Therefore, it is, and can only 
be, the transtemporal totality that is concretely real.11  For clarity, I shall hereafter speak of this 
reality as the Totality, with a capital ‘T’. 
 Such, and related matters, is the major focus of our work.  But we are also concerned to 
give at least a very brief indication of some of the practical implications of these considerations.  
This is not just the application of theory to practice; it is just as much an elucidation of the 
meaning and significance of our theory.  As we have already indicated, there is no deep divide 
between metaphysics and these practical concerns.  We speak here of ethics, politics, and related 
matters.  Our middle-way approach continues to be useful in this sphere.  Our task is to 
determine the specific character of this middle way. 
 
                                                
11 Even this statement must be qualified, however.  From our perspective in time, and indeed, from any 
intertemporal perspective, the Totality does not even exist yet.  So it is, in a way, an excess and another extreme 
view to declare the concrete reality of the Totality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
THE BASIS OF REALITY 
 
 
 
The question of being is the darkest in all philosophy. 
William James 
 
 
 
Preamble 
 
 
 
 As we enter into an examination of the nature of reality, it is fitting that we begin with a 
consideration of why there is anything at all.  As has been duly remarked,12 although this is not 
the first question that we ask in the course of our individual development, it is, in a way, the first 
question of metaphysics, the first question of first philosophy—indeed, the first question of all 
inquiry.  Although other questions may be asked and at least provisionally answered without 
engaging this question, this question is primal in the sense that, were there not something, there 
would be neither questioning nor anything to question.13  Moreover, the confrontation of this 
question, and especially, the discovery of its true answer, is revelatory of the nature of reality in 
general.  It is important, therefore, that one encounter this deep question, recognize its great 
weight, and come to grips with its special—nay, unique—character. 
 It is interesting and perhaps instructive to note the various ways that this question has 
been received.  My first experience of this came in my early youth when I asked my father why 
                                                
12 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics. 
13 This is also in a way the first question in the order of generality. 
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there was anything at all.  He told me “there just is,” but this did not satisfy me.  This reply 
seemed to make an issue of great moment, indeed, an issue of supreme moment, into a matter of 
mere chance.  Aggravated by my persistence in the face of his inability to answer, my father 
finally exclaimed, “I don’t know, but there’s nothing I can do about it, so what difference does it 
make?” 
 The question concerning the basis of reality can indeed be a frustrating one.  The usual 
manner of explaining things is by appeal to something external to the thing explained (this is so 
whether the explanation is causal or purposive).  But clearly this approach is ruled out here.  One 
might understandably think, therefore, that no explanation of the totality of things is possible.  
And, in the grip of this belief, one might, with ostensibly greater sophistication, declare that the 
question itself is ill framed or even meaningless.14 
 Such denial of the legitimacy of the question, however common it has been amongst 
recent analysts, is a great and grave error.  Anyone who has truly faced the question knows that it 
is not only meaningful but profoundly so.  It is indeed true, however, that “…a question cannot 
be regarded as a well-posed challenge merely because the questioner finds it psychologically 
insistent, experiences a strong feeling of puzzlement, and desires an answer to it.”15  So we 
should consider this concern, evaluate it in the present context, and offer a reply.16  Meanwhile, 
on the other side, Robert Lawrence Kuhn calls the question Why is there anything at all? the 
                                                
14 One can find a widely read example of this sort of response in Paul Edwards, “Why”, in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
15 Adolf Grünbaum, “Creation in Cosmology”, reprinted in John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of 
Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? p. 59. 
16 Often the best way to demonstrate that a question is answerable is simply to answer it. 
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“magisterial Question”.17  Kuhn continues: “Why is there Something rather than Nothing?  Why 
Not Nothing?  If you don’t get dizzy, you really don’t get it.”18 
 Why should one think that the question concerning the basis of reality is not only a 
reasonable question but also an insistent one?  In the work of Leibniz we find a locus classicus 
stating the challenge: 
…nothing happens without it being possible for someone who knows enough 
things to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so and not otherwise.  
Assuming this principle, the first question that we have the right to ask will be, 
why is there something rather than nothing?  For nothing is simpler and easier 
than something.19 
The manifest presence of reality, of something, commonplace though it be, certainly seems 
something requiring account.  All the more so since existence may seem to impose a burden that 
non-existence does not.  Were the case different, were perfect non-existent the truth rather than 
existence (ignoring the obvious fact that, were such the case, no one would be around to care), 
there would be nothing in need of explanation.  As Leibniz notes, “nothing is simpler and easier 
than something”.20  The lack of anything at all would seem to be the default condition, and 
therefore the fact of existence would seem to require some sufficient reason. 
 Before we offer our solution, it is important that we appreciate the difficulty of the 
question and understand its unique character.  Otherwise, we might have unreasonable 
expectations concerning what constitutes a satisfactory and satisfying reply.  If we expect 
                                                
17 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Why Not Nothing?” in John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of 
Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? p. 261. 
18 Ibid. p. 262.  Although Kuhn has not yet found an answer that satisfies him in this connection, he evinces great 
determination and commitment in his sustained endeavor to discover the truth. 
19 G. W. Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, section 7. 
20 This remark is ambiguous in way that is ironic in the present context.  It could be read as: there is nothing that is 
simpler and easier than something. 
 24 
something that, given the nature of the case, is simply impossible to provide, we may fail to 
recognize the true answer when we see it, and fail to be satisfied with what is in fact the true and 
complete explanation of the existence of reality. 
 
 
On the Difficulty of the Question 
 
 
 
 There is something.  There is no truth concerning which we can be more certain.  This is 
striking, for we know this truth empirically.  It is peculiar that this most certain truth is, at the 
same time, the most enigmatic mystery.  So, at any rate, it has often been received. 
 In approaching his discussion of what he calls the problem of being, William James says: 
…in order not to conceal any of the skeletons in the philosophic closet, I will start 
with the worst problem possible, the so-called ‘ontological problem,’ or question 
of how there comes to be anything at all.21 
Why should this be, or at least be considered, a difficult question?  What would count as a good 
answer?  Perhaps this problem is not as intractable as it has generally seemed.  But let us first 
indicate the basis for the supposed difficulty. 
 When I ask my students to respond to the question of why there is anything at all, the 
most common reply, at least among those who think that they have the answer, is that something 
exists because God created it.  This is no surprise, for this reply has been offered often enough by 
                                                
21 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, Chapter II: “The 
Problems of Metaphysics”, p. 37. 
 25 
philosophers and theologians as well as the uninitiated.  But this reply does not really address the 
question, for God is itself something.  Therefore, the question simply recurs for God.22 
 The failure of this reply illustrates the unique character of the question.  Any external 
cause or source calls in turn for its own explanation, and so cannot provide the final answer.  So 
even if it were true that God created the world as we know it, the invocation of God (by itself) 
serves us not at all in explaining the ultimate basis of reality.  At best, it only defers the issue. 
 If we cannot rely on God, perhaps we can rely on nothing.  And indeed, another proposal 
in this connection is that something somehow arose from nothing.  Let us call this proposal the 
view that reality is spontaneously arisen.  That this should have happened is, to say the least, 
puzzling. 
If…it had a beginning, when was that, and why? 
You are up against the previous nothing, and do not see how it ever passed into 
being.  This dilemma, of having to choose between a regress which, although 
called infinite, has nevertheless come to a termination, and an absolute first, has 
played a great part in philosophy’s history.23 
But this approach at least has the virtue of recognizing that the question is concerned with why 
there is anything at all, and does not just attempt to explain the existence one part of reality in 
terms of another, as in the God hypothesis. 
 But the supposition that there was an absolute beginning from nothing seems altogether 
untenable.  In the language of Medieval Western philosophy, ex nihilo nihil fit.24  If nothing were 
                                                
22 Recall Kant’s expression of God’s own query: “I am from eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing 
save what is through my will, but whence then am I?”  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by 
Norman Kemp Smith, A613/B641. 
23 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, Chapter III: The 
Problem of Being, p. 41. 
24 Latin: From nothing, nothing comes. 
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the primal or basic state, something would be impossible.  This point is nicely expressed by 
James: 
Not only that anything should be, but that this very thing should be, is mysterious!  
Philosophy stares, but brings no reasoned solution, for from nothing to being there 
is no logical bridge.25 
Moreover, this “solution” offers no answer to the mystery of existence.  The most that we can 
say on this account is that the arrival of reality was a matter of mere chance.  Which of course is 
no explanation at all. 
 Even so, this is one of the views on the origin of reality that has been maintained.  
Indeed, many creation myths around the world presume that nothing was the primal state.26  But 
twentieth-century scientific cosmology has also been expressed in these terms.  In particular, 
certain early versions of big-bang cosmogony supposed an absolute beginning to the universe.  
In recent years, the notion of the “multiverse” has become quite popular among physicists.  But 
this concept is by no means new.  Indeed, it has ancient roots in Indian cosmology.  Meanwhile, 
the West, under the influence of Hebraic folklore, has taken a long time to catch up. 
 Among those who have reflected on the mystery of existence, some have a strong 
intuition that even if reality did not arise from nothing, nothing is nonetheless, in some sense, the 
more natural or expected case.  We already saw an indication of this in Leibniz, but many have 
felt this intuition (I must say, myself among them).  The point is well-expressed by Kuhn: 
                                                
25 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, Chapter III: The 
Problem of Being, pp. 39-40. 
26 The Vedic Hymn of Creation is an illustrative case in point. 
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…an a priori weighing of Nothing vs. Something (from a timeless, explanatorily 
earlier perspective) would, for me, tip the balance heavily to Nothing, but for the 
fact of the matter [which is that there is something].27 
Again: 
Thus, since I have no choice but to recognize that there is Something, I have no 
choice but to conclude that there is some deep reason, force, productive principle 
or type of necessity that brings about the absence of Nothing.  I cannot rid myself 
of the conviction that Nothing would have obtained had not something special 
somehow superceded or counteracted it.28 
 Given this intuition, the presence of something seems remarkable—indeed, astonishing.  I 
am sympathetic.  In fact, I believe that this intuition points to a deep truth: were nothing the 
primal state or original position, it would not be possible that there should ever be something.  
But I also believe that part of the basis for this intuition is the assumption, perhaps unrecognized, 
that there was once an option between something and nothing.  Why then would something be 
chosen, when nothing is so much less trouble? 
 Were it possible that there should be an actual choice between something and nothing, I 
believe that this intuition would be correct.  It is not possible, however, for there to be a 
“selection”29 between something and nothing from a position that is neutral as to something or 
nothing: any such supposed selection would necessarily occur either from the side of nothing or 
from the side of something (and of course from the side of nothing there would be no basis for 
                                                
27 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Why Not Nothing?” in John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of 
Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? p. 258. 
28 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Why Not Nothing?” in John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of 
Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? p. 258. 
29 For a discussion of selection in this context, see Derek Parfit, “Why Anything?  Why This? 1998. [Reprinted in 
John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? pp. 220-237]. 
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any selection to occur).  So the issue is already decided before any decision can even be made.  
The supposition of a “timeless, explanatorily earlier perspective”30 is a deceptive fiction.  Even 
so, the presence of something is remarkable, is astonishing, is wonderful.31 
 Replies to the mystery of existence often suppose that we must begin with nothing.  But 
some have maintained that this is an unwarranted bias.32  However, even if one does not suppose 
that nothing was the primordial condition, or even that it is the more natural or expected state, 
one might still think that nothing—the complete absence of anything—is at least possible.  
Schopenhauer can be interpreted in this fashion: 
…this world’s non-existence is just as possible as is its existence.  Therefore, 
Spinoza’s view of the world as an absolutely necessary mode of existence, in 
other words, as something that positively and in every sense ought to and must be, 
is a false one.  Even simple theism in its cosmological proof tacitly starts from the 
fact that it infers the world’s previous non-existence from its existence; thus, it 
assumes in advance that the world is something contingent.33 
 We shall revisit Schopenhauer’s claim and consider whether in this remark he means 
reality generally or only this world in the limited sense.  Meanwhile, an important point to 
register here is that the difficulty of the mystery of existence is exacerbated—nay, rendered 
insoluble—by the belief that nothing was the primal state.  But even the supposition that there 
need not have been anything at all establishes the condition for a truly insoluble problem. 
                                                
30 Kuhn. 
31 Or terrible, as in Schopenhauer’s reckoning. 
32 In this connection, Robert Nozick draws a distinction between what he calls inegalitarian and egalitarian 
theories, that is, between theories that privilege nothing, and those that do not.  See Robert Nozick in Leslie and 
Kuhn. 
33 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, p. 171. 
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 So why is there something rather than nothing?  We have reached an apparent impasse.  
By now, it should be evident that this is no ordinary question, and why so many, philosophers 
and ordinary people alike, have found it perplexing.  With the immediately foregoing 
preliminary presentation of proposals in reply to this question, we have illustrated that there may 
seem to be the following dilemma: either (1) we must, as in ordinary explanation, appeal to 
something external to the thing to be explained (such as God or some basic ground or source), in 
which case the question is not even addressed, or (2) we must suppose that reality has no basis 
and has arisen for no reason at all, in which case the question is not only unanswered but 
unanswerable.  This is the challenge, nicely expressed in these words from an influential 
contemporary physicist: 
Why is there something rather than nothing?  I can’t imagine anything that would 
serve as an answer to this question, let alone an answer supported by evidence.  
Even religion fails here, for if the answer is “God,” there was something—God, 
that is—to begin with.  Or, If time has no beginning, do all causes recede into the 
infinite past?  Is there no final reason for things?  These are real questions, but if 
they have answers, those are likely to forever remain outside science.34 
 Given the difficulty (or special—indeed, unique—character) of the question of being, it is 
not surprising that reactions to it have been various.  Among people who have encountered the 
question, some are profoundly troubled, some are indifferent, and some dismiss the question as 
altogether illegitimate, even meaningless.  Perhaps in this case especially, James’ remarks on the 
role of temperament in philosophical preferences are applicable.  But a person’s other 
commitments are also influential in framing their reactions to this question.  For instance, a 
person who already believes in God and a created world will naturally try to situate their reply in 
                                                
34 Lee Smolin, Time Reborn, pp. 265-266. 
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these terms.  Meanwhile, the atheist will dismiss such attempts as groundless.  This is actually as 
it should be, for one should seek to harmonize one’s beliefs about the world.  Indeed, this is a 
central task of philosophy. 
 In his customary condescension, Schopenhauer remarks: 
The lower a man is in an intellectual respect, the less puzzling and mysterious 
existence itself is to him; on the contrary, everything, how it is and that it is, 
seems to him a matter of course.35 
I think that there really is something to this.  But I also think that it is only half the story.  A 
person can be indifferent to the question because they do not even understand the issue.  But a 
person can also get past the question once they have found their way to a satisfactory and 
satisfying answer.  Of course, the latter sort of person may still want to engage the question, 
either for the benefit of others who still find it perplexing, or for illustrating and grounding 
broader philosophical concerns. 
 In what is, in a way, the opposite to the response of Schopenhauer, some analysts have 
dismissed the question.  Nicholas Rescher calls this “the rejectionist approach” (to the riddle of 
existence).36  The reasons for such rejection have been various, but generally can be classed in 
two categories.  Some dismiss the question because they think that it is unanswerable in 
principle.  If a question is unanswerable in principle, there may be no further reason to consider 
it, at least once this fact is discovered.  Others dismiss the question because they believe that it is 
not a genuine question at all, that it is, strictly speaking, meaningless.37  This reason for rejecting 
the question is related to the previous one, for part of the reason for supposing the question 
                                                
35 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, p. 161. 
36 Nicholas Rescher, The Riddle of Existence, 1984, reprinted in Leslie and Kuhn, pp. 284-288. 
37 Paul Edwards asserts this contention in connection with what he calls the “super-ultimate” why question.  He 
allows that certain basic questions, such as was the world created by God? are meaningful.  See Paul Edwards, 
“Why”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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meaningless is that it is supposed unanswerable in principle.  This sort of reply was fashionable 
during the heyday of logical positivism and the verificationist theory of meaning in the twentieth 
century. 
 Before providing reasons for rejecting this rejection, let us acknowledge that this 
response to the mystery of existence is not without significant motives.  Obviously, and as we 
continue to emphasize, this is no ordinary question.  Any appeal to external reasons is ruled out 
by the very nature of the case.  This applies not only to causal explanations, but also to supposed 
teleological justifications.  In the sense of the term in play here, a purpose is just as much 
something as a cause is.  This means that the explanation in terms of value that has been 
proposed by John Leslie and others (with antecedents in Plato and others) is also unworkable.38 
 It matters not whether this supposed justification is used for the world or for God.  Here 
is an expression of this notion from Ewing: 
I must admit that the concept of God for most philosophers who have reflected on 
it deeply does include necessity in some sense as an ingredient.  The existence of 
God, it is felt, could not be merely a contingent fact….   But, I ask, need the 
necessity be logical necessity?  Might not God be necessary in some sense other 
than that in which his necessity would mean that there was an internal 
contradiction in denying his existence?  …we seem to need a reason of such a 
kind as will give an explanation of existence without making the non-existence of 
anything logically self-contradictory.  There remains only one alternative, as far 
as can be seen, which might do this, namely an explanation in terms of values.  In 
that case God’s existence will be necessary not because there would be any 
                                                
38 For a defense of the claim, see John Leslie, “A Cosmos Existing through Ethical Necessity”, pp. 126-141 in Leslie 
and Kuhn. 
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internal self-contradiction in denying it but because it was supremely good that 
God should exist.39 
The trouble is this: If God exists, then whatever value God possesses, or that God’s existence 
possesses, is posterior to (or equiprimordial with) the existence of God, not prior to it, and thus 
cannot serve as ground for God’s existence, unless of course God already existed, in which case 
God’s existence would itself do the trick. 
 So, in saying that the question is unanswerable, the rejectionists are partly right: the 
question is indeed unanswerable in the manner to which we are accustomed: the external appeal 
of ordinary explanation.40  If this question is to be answered at all, it must be answered in terms 
of something that is not external to the thing to be explained, for the ample reason that there is 
nothing external to the thing to be explained.  We must bear these considerations in mind in 
evaluating proposed solutions.  Otherwise, we might fail to recognize a good answer when we 
see it, and not be satisfied when we should be satisfied. 
 The question concerning the basis of reality may be asked—and often is asked—with 
unrealistic and indeed irrational expectations.  It is this that generates much of the resolvable 
mystery surrounding this issue.  Indeed, these unrealistic expectations create a sort of catch-22: a 
traditional sort of explanation may be expected, but no such explanation can address the actual 
question; meanwhile, the explanation that does address the actual question may not meet 
expectations, and so may not appear to really answer the question.  In short, the expectations 
may be such that the only way deemed satisfactory to answer the question is a way in which the 
question cannot be answered.  One way of responding to this conundrum is to just revert to the 
claim that the question is unanswerable.  Our preferred approach, and the only way to succeed in 
                                                
39 Ewing, in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 124. 
40 Cf. Hempel’s “covering-law model” of explanation. 
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this endeavor, is to acquire realistic expectations.  But this is decidedly not to endorse modest 
expectations.  It is simply to realize the nature of the case, and to recognize the true and complete 
answer when we see it. 
 What would count as a good answer to the mystery of existence?  Since the question of 
why there is something rather than nothing is a unique question, it requires a unique answer, an 
answer that, for ordinary questions, would not be satisfactory.  We just said that if this question 
is to be answered at all, it must be answered in terms of something that is not external to the 
thing to be explained.  Is this even possible?  Can the existence of reality be explained on its own 
ground?  In this connection, Robert Nozick speaks of what he calls “explanatory self-
subsumption”.41  As Nozick explains, this involves, in some sense, a fact explaining itself: 
Since a fact that nothing explains is left dangling, while a fact explained by 
something else leaves the problem of explaining that something else, only one 
thing could leave nothing at all unexplained: a fact that explains itself.42 
Although Nozick’s examples of this notion are rather different from the solution toward which 
we are working, I think that our approach might reasonably be placed in this category.  Is this 
just brute fact then, after all?  In one sense yes, but in another (and important) sense no. 
If a brute is something that cannot be explained by anything, then a self-
subsumable principle isn’t a brute fact; but if a brute fact is something that cannot 
be explained by anything else, such a principle counts as a brute fact…43 
The existence of reality in general—the existence of the Totality—naturally cannot be explained 
by anything else, for there is nothing else.  But this does not mean that it cannot be explained.  
                                                
41 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, chapter 2, 1981, reprinted in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 238-246. 
42 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, chapter 2, 1981, in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 239. 
43 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, chapter 2, 1981, in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 240. 
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And it does not mean that it is a brute fact in the sense of being capricious and arbitrary.  It is 
not something that happens to be the case but might just as well not have been the case. 
 We seek an answer to the mystery of existence that is both satisfactory and satisfying.  To 
be satisfactory, the answer must truly address the question and it must provide a true and 
complete explanation of the basis of reality.  To be satisfying, the answer must be satisfactory, 
and it must reveal why any residual mystery is beyond both the possibility of, and the need for, 
further explanation. 
 
 
Proposed Solutions 
 
 
 
 It is fitting that we should preface our proposed solution with a brief survey of the 
theoretical landscape.  Our aim in this is to glean whatever insights we can, as well as to learn to 
recognize and avoid the pitfalls.  Moreover, these theories will provide useful contrasts to our 
preferred position, and will help both to motivate our theory and to reveal its virtues. 
 The business of classifying these theories is rather complicated, in part because there is 
overlap and mixed types.  On the one hand, there are various replies to the mystery of existence.  
On the other, there are various theories concerning the nature and origin of reality.  These are 
distinguishable concerns, but there is a close connection between them.  In either case, one can 
identify and list specific instances (which are rather numerous), and one can class them into a set 
of categories, large or small, depending upon one’s purposes.  But when it comes to relating the 
two cases, combinations proliferate, and it becomes quite a mess to try to sort it all out in detail, 
even though there are obvious correlations between the two concerns.  Indeed, one’s reply to the 
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mystery of existence properly depends upon one’s view regarding the basis of reality, which in 
turn is intimately associated with how one understands the nature of reality. 
 In his comprehensive review piece, Kuhn does a very nice and thorough job identifying 
and classifying replies to the mystery of existence.44  There is no need to rehearse the details of 
Kuhn’s fine analysis here.  It will be enough for our present purposes to just identify a few 
principal categories.  One could never be sure that one had exhausted the field in any event.45  
William James provides a list of theories from Herbert Spenser that has the virtue of brevity, and 
that is useful enough for us here.  James asks: 
…how many opinions are possible as to the origin of the world?  Spencer says 
that the world must have been either eternal, or self-created, or created by an 
outside power.  So for him there are only three.  Is this correct?  If so, which of 
the three views seems the most reasonable? and why?46 
We have already discussed the latter two of Spenser’s categories, namely: 
 1) Created by an outside power 
 2) Self-created (or what we called “spontaneous arisen”) 
We found that neither of these approaches is tenable, at least in its crude form.  Among other 
defects, neither is able to offer a satisfactory reply to the mystery of existence. 
 The third of Spenser’s categories is “eternal”.  With the other two categories ruled out, 
this category would seem to be the most promising.  But this is a complicated category with 
                                                
44 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Why Not Nothing?” in John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Mystery of 
Existence: Why Is There Anything At All? pp. 246-278. 
45 As will be evident soon enough, our theory does not fit well in any of the familiar categories, although it does 
contain aspects of some of them. 
46 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, Chapter II: The 
Problems of Metaphysics, p. 33. 
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multiple variants.  We can begin to sort this out by indicating the ambiguity in the term eternal.  
Two interpretations are more-or-less standard: 
 1) Timeless (or timelessly eternal) 
 2) Everlasting (or everlastingly eternal)47 
Is anything eternal in either of these senses?  Well, God is standardly said to be eternal.  And the 
ambiguity just noted applies in the case of God. 
 God is sometimes said to be eternal in the timeless sense.  Of course, this interpretation 
makes for a big problem concerning the possibility of God’s involvement in the world.  For this 
reason, this view is usually associated with deism, the notion that God is the ground or basis for 
the world, or the creator of the laws and original conditions of the world.  According to a 
common version this story, once God, in his infinite wisdom, has established the world, there is 
no need for any further interference on the part of God.  This approach is typically associated 
with a mechanistic view of reality and strict causal determinism.  These presumptions are 
necessary to ensure that everything will indeed unfold according to God’s plan (and thus, 
presumably, for the best) without further tinkering by God. 
 More commonly, God is understood to be eternal in the everlasting sense (sometimes 
called sempiternal, to distinguish this view from the foregoing).  This better accords with the 
popular view of God as active and involved in the affairs of the world.  The supposed efficacy of 
prayer also seems to depend upon this interpretation, although it can be said in reply that God 
foreknew the prayer was coming, and made the necessary adjustments in the original fiat that is 
supposed by the deist to have occurred at the outset. 
Problem: If God is in time, why did he create the world when he did?48 
                                                
47 We are building toward a third interpretation, a middle-way approach, or synthesis.  But we’ll save that for later. 
48 Recall Augustine’s humorous remark in this connection. 
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Problem: If God is perfect and unchanging (as God is often said to be), what sense does it 
make to say that God is in time? 
It considerations of this kind that motivate the timeless view of God. 
 But we are first interested to consider the view that reality in general is eternal.  And, as 
we just noted, this category has two variants.  These two variants are actually quite distinct, at 
least as typically understood.  Indeed, as ordinarily understood, they are mutually exclusive.  So 
it is unfortunate, and generative of confusion, that the same term eternal is applied to both. 
 
 
Reality as Timelessly Eternal (Timeless) 
 
 
 
 Let us begin with a brief account of the theory that reality in general is timelessly eternal 
(or timeless being).  In Western philosophy, the first well-known exponent of this position is 
Parmenides.  We know of Parmenides from some relatively brief surviving writings of a rather 
mystical character, and from representations of his view in some of Plato’s dialogues, one of 
which bears Parmenides’ name.  The teaching for which he is most famous is only being, not 
becoming, is real.  Parmenides offers various reasons for embracing this view.  Meanwhile, his 
fellow Eleatic, the famous Zeno, provides reductio arguments in opposition to the contrasting 
view that movement and change are real.  Much has been written in criticism of these arguments, 
and in the opinion of some, they have been thoroughly debunked.  But many of these criticisms 
miss the point, and in one way or another beg the question in favor of their opposing side.  In 
truth, the outlook of Parmenides and Zeno remains a powerful challenge to some of our most 
general and fundamental common-sense views of the nature of reality.  The phenomena of 
 38 
movement and change, so pervasive in our ordinary experience, remain problematic on common-
sense assumptions concerning the character of these phenomena. 
 But the Parmenidean vision is not without its difficulties.  Most basically, this view does 
not seem to accord with reality at all, at least not with our experience of reality.  For this view to 
be acceptable, then, requires that we take our ordinary experience to be deeply and pervasively 
illusory.  But it is difficult (and I think impossible) to explain, in terms of this doctrine, how 
there is even the appearance of movement and change (that is, the illusion). 
 The notion that reality is timelessly eternal is not restricted to the early Eleatics.  Among 
modern Western philosophers, Spinoza is properly situated in this category.49  Of course, 
Spinoza is considerably more detailed and sophisticated than Parmenides (or at least what we 
know of Parmenides).  But Spinoza still presents what William James calls a block universe view 
of reality, that is, a strict determinism with no open future.  According to Spinoza, even God is 
subject to strict necessity: 
Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other 
order than is the case.50 
Indeed, on Spinoza’s account, there is no real contingency anywhere: 
Since I have here shown more clearly than the midday sun that in things there is 
absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be said to be “contingent,” I now 
wish to explain briefly what we should understand by “contingent”; but I must 
first deal with “necessary” and “impossible.”  A thing is termed “necessary” 
either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.  For a thing’s existence 
necessarily follows either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient 
                                                
49 Although some of his votaries will disagree. 
50 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, p. 235. 
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cause.  Again, it is for these same reasons that a thing is termed “impossible”—
that is, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction or because 
there is no external cause determined to bring it into existence.  But a thing is 
termed “contingent” for no other reason than the deficiency of our knowledge….  
So we term it either “contingent” or “possible”.51 
 James thinks that absolute idealism is stuck with the block-universe view as well, even 
the version of this that Josiah Royce calls objective idealism.  But of course, Royce disagrees, 
and argues otherwise.52  Royce embraces the standard view that God is omniscient, and that this 
means that God has knowledge of the whole temporal extent of reality, including what we call 
the future, but, as Royce insightfully insists, this is “ill-called divine foreknowledge.”53 
 Meanwhile, contemporary physics, in one of its major expressions, seems to entail the 
view that reality is timelessly eternal.  I refer, of course, to Einstein’s theories of relativity.  The 
theory of time generally associated with relativity theory is often called “four-dimensionalism”.  
According to this view, although time remains as a dimension of reality, there is no real 
movement or change in the commonsense understanding of these things; everything timelessly 
exists in its own spacetime location in the spacetime manifold.  Many contemporary physicists 
happily embrace the “block universe” designation for this view.  They use this term, not as a 
pejorative, as did James, but as an ostensibly neutral descriptive title.  Insofar as they are 
operating as physicists and not philosophers, they ignore the problematic implications that this 
picture of reality has for freedom, ethics, and meaning. 
                                                
51 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, Scholium 1, p. 236. 
52 Although the view that I am developing here goes a good way beyond Royce, Royce was a significant early 
influence on my philosophy, and he still has a special place in my heart for the important insights I gleaned from 
him.  He remains worthy of serious study, and I am gladdened that a small but vibrant community has recently come 
together to promote this. 
53 Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, “The Temporal and the Eternal”. 
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 In addition to these practical concerns, the theory that reality is timelessly eternal faces 
some serious theoretical challenges, at least in is basic or pure form, such as we are treating it 
here.  But it also has some powerful motivations and strong points in its favor.  Among these is 
its ability to provide a reasonable reply to the mystery of existence: if reality is timelessly 
eternal, then there is no issue of it coming or going, arising or ceasing.  There is, therefore, never 
an issue of it not existing.54 
 The theory that reality is timelessly eternal is deficient and one-sided in its basic form, 
and requires significant emendation if it is to be viable.  Even so, it does point to a deep truth. 
 
 
Reality as Everlasting (Everlastingly Eternal) 
 
 
 
 Next to consider is the theory that reality in general is everlasting.  As we indicated, the 
term eternal is often applied to this view as well.  I think it best to avoid the term eternal for the 
present theory.  But the term everlasting is itself not without its shortcomings.  Ordinarily, this 
term designates the view that reality is both beginningless and endless.  But the basic 
significance of the term is such that its ordinary usage is also compatible with the view that 
reality had a beginning, but, from that beginning, lasts forever.  We exclude cases of this kind 
here, having already included them under Spenser’s categories of self-created and created by an 
outside power, of which they are compatible variants.  Obviously, these cases suppose very 
different bases of reality than does the case at issue here, and we have already indicated the 
difficulties respectively associated with each of them. 
 In Western philosophy, Heraclitus is the first well-known exponent of the view that 
reality is everlasting (or endless becoming).  As with Parmenides, we know of Heraclitus from 
                                                
54 We shall develop this point when we express and defend our preferred position. 
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some relatively brief surviving writings of a mystical character.  Heraclitus’ view is also 
represented in the writings of Aristotle.  Heraclitus is generally presented as a partisan of 
becoming in contrast to being, even though some authorities on Heraclitus insist that he actually 
had a more balanced and nuanced view.  But this historical issue is beside the point here.  
Heraclitus’ most famous remark is that one cannot step into the same river twice.  By this he 
meant that a river, like everything else, is constantly changing; everything is in a state of flux.  
According to Aristotle, Heraclitus’ associate Cratylus, not to be outdone, contended that one 
cannot even step into the same river once. 
 Among modern Western philosophers, Hume has defended the position that there is no 
difficulty is supposing that reality is beginningless and groundless: 
…in tracing an eternal succession of objects it seems absurd to inquire for a 
general cause or first author.  How can anything that exists from eternity have a 
cause, since that relation implies a priority in time and a beginning of existence? 
 In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that 
which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it.  Where then is the 
difficulty?  But the whole, you say, wants a cause.  I answer that the uniting of 
these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one 
kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an 
arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things.  Did I show 
you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of 
matter, I should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what 
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was the cause of the whole twenty.  This is sufficiently explained in explaining 
the cause of the parts.55 
 The view that reality is constantly changing, a concomitant of the theory that reality is 
everlasting, accords much better with ordinary experience and common sense than does the view 
that reality is timeless.  But the theory that reality is everlasting and uncreated has some familiar 
difficulties.  Among them is the problem of supposing that an infinite amount of time has 
elapsed.  This problem is a consequence of the absurdity of supposing that an actual infinite 
series has been generated through a process of successive accumulation.56  It is for this reason 
that some have thought that endlessness (which is a potential infinite in the direction of the 
future) is not problematic in the way that beginninglessness (which is an actual infinite in the 
direction of the past) is.  But whether the temporal direction makes a difference is dependent 
upon one’s theory of time and temporality.  The theory that reality is everlasting, as we are 
treating it here, is associated with the notion of temporal flow or passage.  It is the supposition 
that time elapses that makes the notion of an infinite reach of time in the direction of the past 
problematic.  One might endorse a different theory of time and still maintain that reality is 
temporally unlimited in the direction of the past (or the future, or both).57 
 Another significant difficulty for the theory that reality is everlasting and uncreated is the 
problem of (unresolved) contingency.  The classic statement of this challenge is found in 
Leibniz: 
…to whatever earlier state you go back, you never find in it the complete reason 
of things, that is to say, the reason why there exists any world and why this world 
                                                
55 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited by Richard H. Popkin, Hackett Publishing 
Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, second edition, 1998 [1980], Part IX, p. 56. 
56 Cf. Kant’s “successive synthesis”. 
57 A detailed account of time and the temporal character of reality is a key component of our discussion in the 
succeeding chapter (“The Nature of Reality”). 
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rather than some other….  You may indeed suppose the world eternal; but as you 
suppose only a succession of states, in none of which do you find the sufficient 
reason….  From this it is manifest that even by supposing the eternity of the 
world, we cannot escape the ultimate extramundane reason of things, that is to 
say, God.58 
This difficulty is also nicely expressed by Kant: 
Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, a regularity 
in origination and dissolution.  Nothing has of itself come into the condition in 
which we find it to exist, but always points to something else as its cause, while 
this in turn commits us to repetition of the same enquiry.  The whole universe 
must thus sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless, over and above the infinite 
chain of contingencies, we assume something to support it—something which is 
original and independently self-subsistent, and which as the cause of the origin of 
the universe secures also at the same time its continuance.59 
Copleston reiterates the point in his famous debate with Bertrand Russell: 
…what we call the world consists simply of contingent beings.  That is, of beings 
no one of which can account for its own existence….  I say that if there were no 
necessary being, no being which must exist and cannot not-exist, nothing would 
exist.  The infinity of the series of contingent beings, even if proved, would be 
                                                
58 Leibniz, in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 120. 
59 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, A622/B650.  The earlier portion of 
this passage echoes a central theme of Buddhist philosophy, namely, pratitya-samutpada (Sanskrit: “dependent 
origination”). 
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irrelevant.  Something does exist; therefore, there must be something which 
accounts for this fact, a being which is outside the series of contingent beings.60 
The problem of contingency is rendered virulent by the same assumption that engenders the 
problematic character of the notion of an infinite reach of time in the direction of past, namely, 
the assumption that time elapses.  But any view that rejects this assumption is not properly 
included in this category. 
 A final difficulty that we here mention and emphasize is that the theory that reality is 
everlasting is unable to provide a satisfactory and satisfying reply to the mystery of existence.  
This point is closely related to the problem of contingency, and is, indeed, a consequence of it.  
The best response to the mystery that can be given from this perspective is that reality has always 
existed, and therefore there is no issue of having to explain how it came into existence.  Each 
portion of reality is, on this view, contingent, but each portion has its ground or sufficient reason 
in its antecedent cause.  As to the series itself, or the whole of reality, these are said to be no 
more than abstract designations for the parts considered collectively.61  As James says, we 
consider reality one whenever we “fling the term universe at it”, but there may be no good reason 
to suppose that this “unity” is anything more than a conceptual collection of elements.  On this 
view, it is the parts or elements that are supposed real, or taken to be the primary reality.  This 
view may endorse some form of atomism, or it may decline to take a position concerning the 
ultimate basis of reality.  Many find this view adequate.  I do not. 
 The foregoing considerations, individually and collectively, are fatal to the view that 
reality is everlastingly eternal, at least in the standard form presented here (that is, the view that 
reality is a strung-along affair of constant passage).  Even so, and despite these shortcomings, the 
                                                
60 Copleston, in Leslie and Kuhn, p. 55. 
61 Refer to the previous quotation from Hume for a classic statement of this orientation.  This is the bottom-up 
approach to reality.  The truth is very nearly the opposite. 
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theory that reality is everlasting does have some significant virtues.  For one, this theory avoids 
the absurd alternative of supposing that reality just arose from nothing some finite time ago with 
no basis whatsoever.  Moreover, the notion that reality is beginningless may well be true.  
Finally, this theory embraces a commonsense understanding of time, which, although in certain 
respects importantly mistaken, nonetheless points to an important feature of the temporal 
character of reality, a feature that any viable theory of reality must preserve.62 
 
 
Reality as a Created World and an Eternal Creator (Dualistic Theism) 
 
 
 
 We have now to consider a more sophisticated version of the theory that the world stands 
in a relation of dependence to an external source or creator.  We earlier dismissed the crude form 
of this reply to the mystery of existence for the reason that it merely defers the question rather 
than answering it.  But we may seem to be driven back to invoking God by the problem of 
contingency, if not as an adequate answer to the mystery of existence, at least as a way to 
account for the apparently contingent world.63  In any event, an exploration of the motives and 
virtues of this approach may point the way to a solution to the mystery of existence and to a 
deeper understanding of the nature of reality. 
 To illustrate the motivation for this approach, I recall a midnight discussion I once had 
with a coworker while searching for endangered black-footed ferrets with the U. S. Forrest 
Service on the eastern plains of Wyoming.  I was contending that the existence of the world 
requires some kind of explanation, and that the existence God provides this.  “Well, what about 
God,” my associate asked.  My thought at the time was that the existence of God is not puzzling 
                                                
62 As the physicists say, we must “save the phenomenon”. 
63 Leibniz famously makes this case. 
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in the way that the existence of the world is.  Although I did not have the words for it then, my 
supposition was that the world is contingent in a way that God is not.  This is, in essence, the 
more sophisticated version of the theistic reply.  The world is contingent, and thus dependent 
upon an external ground, God.  But God is not contingent; God is necessary (God necessarily 
exists).64 
 This theory has the significant virtue that it is able to offer a reasonable reply to the 
mystery of existence: the world exists because God created (or grounds) it, and God exists 
because God necessarily exists.  If it is asked why God necessarily exists, the reply is, because 
God is eternal.65  But this had better not be interpreted as eternal in the sense of everlasting, 
otherwise the problem of contingency simply recurs for God, and there is no gain over the 
simpler view that the world itself exists because it is everlasting. 
 This advantage notwithstanding, the theistic reply has momentous difficulties.  We 
indicated some of these earlier in this section, and we need not rehearse them here.  We here 
mention only the problem of evil.  This issue alone is sufficient to pretty well decisively discredit 
the theistic view, at least in any crudely dualistic form.66  But it is the dualistic form of theism 
upon which this approach depends.  Of course, Leibniz’s point that we see but a small portion of 
reality is an important one, and should be born in mind.  But in this instance, I think that we see 
enough.  I here recall Santayana’s paraphrase of James: 
                                                
64 For a lucid contemporary expression of this view, see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2004, portions 
reprinted in Leslie and Kuhn, pp. 147-153.  Swinburne’s notion of factually necessary existence (p. 149) is 
significant. 
65 There are actually a variety of ways of interpreting and justifying the supposed necessity of God.  But this is 
beside the point for now. 
66 By “crudely dualistic”, I mean the view that God and world are different realms of reality that stand in a decidedly 
asymmetric relationship of priority and dependence: the world is supposed to be dependent upon God, while God is 
supposed to be independent of the world.  This view naturally has various correlates that need not be mentioned 
here. 
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As William James put it, in his picturesque manner, if at the last day all creation 
was shouting hallelujah and there remained one cockroach with an unrequited 
love, that would spoil the universal harmony….  The existence of any evil 
anywhere at any time absolutely ruins a total optimism.67 
The point in the present context is that we need not presume that evil pervades all time and space 
for there to be a problem.  Perhaps it is localized to our own immediate neighborhood.  
Nonetheless, that would be enough, and indeed more than enough, to establish the problem of 
evil for dualistic theism.  In the face of this challenge, I think the only recourse for the dualistic 
theist is to suppose that we are unable to make any reasonable judgments in this sphere at all.  
But if this is so, we may as well take up the way of Diogenes the Cynic, and not trouble 
ourselves with the struggle and toil of philosophy. 
 Despite this fatal shortcoming, and despite its other difficulties, the sophisticated version 
of dualistic theism has some important lessons to teach us.  In order to provide a satisfactory 
reply to the mystery of existence, something must be self-grounded and necessary.   The 
sophisticated version of dualistic theism has this feature.  Of course, the theory that reality is 
timelessly eternal has this feature as well, but this latter view, in its standard form, does not 
adequately account for the temporal character of reality; pure timeless being, with no temporal 
aspect, is untenable.  Dualistic theism has the virtue of indicating that reality is both temporal 
and eternal in aspect.  But it errs in supposing these aspects to be altogether different realms: the 
timelessly eternal uncreated realm of God, on the one hand, and the temporal created world, on 
the other.  What is needed is a theory that explains both the temporal and the eternal aspects of 
reality, without resorting to this dualistic maneuver with its attendant difficulties. 
 
                                                
67 George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States, p. 107. 
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Summary and Review 
 
 
 
 We have now provided what I take to be an adequate review of the major classes of 
theories concerning the basis of reality, at least for our present purposes.  And we have given 
indication of what each of these can say in response to the mystery of existence.  None of these 
theories, in the form in which I have expressed them here, furnishes a fully satisfactory account 
of the basis of reality.  And yet, we have provided a reasonably comprehensive inventory of the 
field, at least in broad outline, and we have indicated that some of these do have a reasonable 
response to the mystery of existence. 
 Recalling Spenser’s very broad tripartite classification, we can now say in summary that 
two of the three suggestions, namely self-created and created by an outside power, can be 
dismissed as unworthy of further consideration (at least in their crude or straightforward forms).  
Among other defects, neither of these, in its crude form, can provide a proper reply to the 
mystery of existence.  Meanwhile, the sophisticated version of dualistic theism, although able to 
provide a reasonable response to the mystery of existence, is rejected on other grounds.  These 
grounds include subtle points about the difficulty involved in supposing a connection between 
realms that are, by hypothesis, radically opposed in character, and the straightforward point 
regarding the particularly virulent form of the problem of evil to which this view is subject. 
 This leaves just one category, the claim that the world is eternal.  This category includes 
two views that, prima facie at least, are quite distinct, and indeed, mutually exclusive.  We have 
indicated good reason to reject the view that reality is everlasting in the sense of an endless 
becoming with no external or final ground.  Among other defects, this view has no proper reply 
to the mystery of existence.  This just leaves the notion of a timelessly eternal reality.  This view 
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can indeed provide a proper reply to the mystery of existence, but this view is altogether 
incongruous with ordinary experience and common sense, and, in its crude form at least, cannot 
be harmonized with these things. 
 So we seem to have reached another impasse.  What are our options?  Well, maybe 
there’s just no solution at all; maybe “it’s a mystery” is the only true thing we can say concerning 
the ultimate basis of reality.  Those who find this conclusion untidy may set about denying the 
legitimacy of the question.  But perhaps Spenser’s list is not exhaustive—perhaps there is some 
fourth, hitherto unrecognized, category.  Or perhaps what is needed is some new subcategory, a 
theory that could reasonably be included under one of the three broad headings, but novel in its 
specifics. 
 I think that the theory of reality that I am introducing here is properly-enough classed 
under Spenser’s category of eternal.  But it is significantly distinct from both of the versions that 
we have hitherto outlined.  Like the account of the timelessly eternal, it is able to provide a 
proper reply to the mystery of existence.  Like the account of the everlastingly eternal, it insists 
that reality itself is temporal in character, and that the essential temporal features of reality are 
not mere illusions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
TIME AND REALITY 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
The Transtemporal Totality and the Open Future 
 
 
 
 For some time now, I have maintained that although the universe is properly understood 
to be a transtemporal totality, and is, in this sense, eternal, it nonetheless remains true that the 
future is open, that the future is not yet settled as to its specific character. 
 So I have maintained, and so I continue to maintain, but I am not convinced that I have 
won any converts yet. 
 It is objected that my assertions in this connection are inconsistent, for—so the charge 
runs—if it is true that the universe is eternal in the way that I affirm, then the future cannot be 
open in any significant sense.  Or it is supposed that I am simply endorsing a version of some 
already established theory, usually the so-called growing-block theory, with which my view does 
share certain important features. 
 My chief aim here is to explain why the notion of a transtemporal totality is consistent 
with that of an open future. 
 To this end, I first state, as clearly and persuasively as I can, the basis for the charge of 
inconsistency just indicated.  I then offer a refutation of this charge, endeavoring to reveal the 
 51 
source of the misunderstanding that generates the charge.  Finally, I contrast my view in this 
connection with some familiar theories, indicating commonalities and differences. 
 
 
The Charge of Inconsistency 
 
 
 
 I believe that it will be helpful to begin with a formal statement of the argument for the 
charge of inconsistency.  I know that this sort of analysis can be a bit tedious, but given the 
difficulty in making things clear in this connection, I think that it will be worth it.  It will allow 
us to show very specifically where certain disagreements lie. 
 
P1 The universe is a transtemporal totality. 
 
P2 If the universe is a transtemporal totality, then the universe is determinate. 
 
P3 If the universe is determinate, then all temporal portions of the universe are 
determinate. 
 
P4 If all temporal portions of the universe are determinate, then the future is 
determinate. 
 
P5 If the future is determinate, then the future is not open. 
 
C Therefore, the future is not open. 
 
 
 This is obviously a valid deduction.  Moreover, the foregoing set of premises also 
provides a straightforward basis for the further implication that if the universe is a transtemporal 
totality, then the future is not open.  Thus, if I am to refute this argument for inconsistency, I 
must find fault with at least one of the included premises.  Let us continue, then, by briefly 
explicating and evaluating each of these premises in turn. 
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 Premise 1 states that the universe is a transtemporal totality.  This I assert to be true.  
Although I believe that this premise is well justified, let us simply assume it here. 
 In saying that the universe is a transtemporal totality, I mean to imply that the universe is 
a spatiotemporally extended unity comprising the whole of reality, or, as it is sometimes called, a 
spacetime manifold, or, as I have dubbed it, a universal plexus.  Since the universe is not always 
conceived in this way, I am in the habit (as noted previously) of referring to this reality as the 
Totality, with a capital T.  The Totality is eternal—not, obviously, in the sense of everlasting 
(“sempiternal”), nor in the sense of timeless (for the Totality has a temporal dimension)—but 
rather, in the sense of transcending—because comprising—all (apparent) arising, abiding, and 
ceasing.  The Totality is not itself in time; it is closer to the truth to say that time is within it (this 
I signal by speaking of the Totality as a transtemporal totality, and as transtemporally eternal).  
These characteristics entail that the Totality is also necessary, not in an unqualified sense, but 
rather, in the sense that, if the Totality does exist, it must exist (what I call conditional necessity).  
But the Totality does exist (or so I claim).  Therefore, it must exist. 
 Having said all this, I do not think that I should be accused of providing a modest or 
deflationary account of premise 1. 
 Premise 2 states that if the universe is a transtemporal totality, then the universe is 
determinate. 
 Like the term ‘eternal’, the term ‘determinate’ is ambiguous.  Sometimes the term 
‘determinate’ means having fixed limits or boundaries.  This is not the sense of the term that I 
have in mind here, for in saying that the universe is determinate, I do not mean to preclude the 
possibility that the universe is unlimited in its spatiotemporal extent.  Rather, I mean determinate 
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in the sense of settled or definite or “just so”.  Obviously, to be determinate is to be; determinacy 
entails existence.  Indeed, determinacy and existence are mutually entailing. 
 As in the case of premise 1, I assert premise 2 to be true; the problem with the argument 
does not lie here. 
 Premise 3 states that if the universe is determinate, then all temporal portions of the 
universe are determinate. 
 One might suspect that there could be a fallacy of division in play here.  For consider a 
parallel case: If the universe is necessary, then all temporal portions of the universe are 
necessary.  Perhaps this assertion too might capture our intuition, but the supposed inference is 
fallacious.  It is a specimen of the fallacy of division, for in this case, the attribute (necessity) is 
not preserved with the division. 
 Why is it that necessity is not preserved with the division?  It is indeed true, as I have 
already affirmed, that the Totality is necessary.  However, no portion of the Totality is in itself 
necessary (save the “portion” that is the Totality itself).  And why is this?  Because portions of 
the Totality are dependent upon other portions of the Totality,68 and, existing only in dependence 
upon that which is beyond themselves, do not inherently (which is to say independently) exist.  
Therefore, not inherently existing, they are not in themselves necessary. 
 (This dependence of one portion of reality upon another is ordered, and this order of 
dependence is precisely the spatiotemporal continuum itself.  More on this point later.) 
                                                
68 This is not (in the same way) true of those portions of the Totality that have no limit in the direction of the past 
(the earlier).  However, to raise this issue in the main text above would unduly complicate the explication, and, since 
this issue is irrelevant to the point at hand, I there ignore it.  Why is this point irrelevant to the point at hand?  
Because premise 3 makes a universal assertion (“all temporal portions”}, so if any portion of the Totality is 
dependent, then the point stands.  As we shall see, it is precisely with reference to the future that this detail is 
significant. 
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 But perhaps it will be thought that I am, in this reply, merely begging the question, so let 
me say a few words more. 
 Nothing is in itself a portion of the Totality; the Totality is a seamless, although extended, 
unity.  Things are portions of the Totality, then, only by virtue of abstraction.  In other words, it 
is not as though an assortment of inherently existing parts are heaped together (through whatever 
process) in a form that we merely call the Totality; no, it is rather that the Totality is the only 
inherently existing thing, the only thing that is necessary, while what we call parts are merely 
abstractions from this whole.  (I typically use the word ‘portion’, rather that ‘part’, to signal the 
fact that these abstracted portions do not inherently exist [and do not have absolute boundaries].)  
It is an error, therefore, to suppose that that which is only abstractly divisible from the Totality 
should have autonomous existence, and be, in this sense, necessary. 
 Of course, if the necessity that is claimed of the portions is not an autonomous necessity, 
but simply the necessity of existing given that the Totality exists, then there is no difficulty.  
Clearly, all portions of the Totality are necessary in this sense, for the Totality would not be the 
precise determinate entity that it is were any portion of it in any way other than as it actually is.  
(This implies, of course, that we are necessary, in this sense, to the Totality).69 
 With respect to the case of determinacy, then, how does it stand?  Is determinacy lost in 
the division, as is autonomous necessity, or is it preserved, as is dependent necessity?  It is 
preserved.  Why?  I have said that I am understanding the term ‘determinate’ to mean something 
like settled or definite or “just so”.  Given that the Totality exists, and therefore, that each portion 
                                                
69 In contrast, traditional (dualistic) theism has it that while man is dependent upon God, God is independent of man. 
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the Totality exists, then each portion of the Totality is determinate.  This is a conditional 
determinacy, to be sure, but it is determinacy nonetheless.70 
 Therefore, I take no issue with premise 3; indeed, I endorse it.  We still have not found 
the source of the difficulty. 
 Premise 4 states that if all temporal portions of the universe are determinate, then the 
future is determinate. 
 People understand the future in different ways.  Often it is supposed that the future is the 
future in an unqualified or absolute sense.  This way of thinking is naturally associated with the 
view that the present is the present in an unqualified or absolute sense.  (In this connection, 
Aristotle inquires about the now, asking whether there is a single now, or rather, many nows, 
ever and anon succeeding one another.  Aristotle finds it difficult to say.) 
 Consistent with what I have already said concerning the character of the Totality, I 
maintain that the term ‘future’ is a relational—and, in this sense, relative—term.  Strictly 
speaking, there is no the future, no reach of time that is absolutely future, nothing that is future in 
itself.  What counts as future is always relative to some given present moment; in truth, future 
means no more than after—or later than—now (with any moment of thinking or uttering or 
acting being equally now to itself).  Even so, following custom, I am, in this essay, speaking of 
the future.  In this usage, the future is simply a general notion meaning that which is not yet.  
But, being a relational notion, this notion is meaningless without an implicit now—indifferently 
any now—relative to which that, which is to be after, is not yet. 
 Premise 4 is problematic.  What reason is there to suppose premise 4 true?  I think it 
worthwhile to express the argument formally. 
                                                
70 The immediately preceding paragraphs treat of the issue of the relation (of the individual to the Totality and of 
individuals to one another). 
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 Based upon our assessment of premises 1 through 3, we are already in a position to 
declare that the antecedent of premise 4 is true, namely, that all temporal portions of the universe 
are determinate.  Let this then be one of the premises in the argument for premise 4.  What, then, 
is still needed in order to validly deduce premise 4?  Only one more premise, namely, that the 
future is a temporal portion of the universe.  Making this assumption yields: 
 
P6 All temporal portions of the universe are determinate. 
 
P7 The future is a temporal portion of the universe. 
 
C Therefore, the future is determinate. 
 
 
 This argument illustrates the fact that premise 4 can be deduced from its own antecedent 
by conditional proof, provided the assumption of premise 7, that the future is a temporal portion 
of the universe. 
 These are valid deductions, and I have already declared that premise 6, that all temporal 
portions of the universe are determinate, is true.  Thus, if one is to properly deny the conclusion 
that the future is determinate, then one must find fault with premise 7, that the future is a 
temporal portion of the universe, by showing it to be either false or meaningless.  We shall 
explore this possibility in Section II.  Before turning to this task, however, let us round out the 
present discussion by giving some attention to the final premise of the main argument for 
inconsistency. 
 Premise 5 states that if the future is determinate, then the future is not open.  Premise 5 is 
problematic.  Here is one way—and a reasonable way—of interpreting this premise and arguing 
for its truth: 
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 To say that the future is open is to say that there is more than one way that the future 
could turn out to be (P8).  But if the future is determinate, that is, settled or definite or “just so”, 
then there is only one way that the future could turn out to be (P9).  Therefore, if the future is 
determinate, then the future is not open (C).  Accordingly, premise 5 is true. 
 As I say, this is a reasonable way of interpreting and assessing premise 5.  But is its not 
the only way.  Indeed, as I shall explain in the next section, there is an interpretation of premise 
5, also reasonable, in which premise 5 turns out to be false.  Before turning to this other 
interpretation, however, let us consider just briefly some further preparatory matters. 
 What are the implications of the consequent of premise 5?  If the future is not open, does 
this mean that the future is fated?  In this connection, Alan Rhoda provides a very helpful and 
revealing typology of the different bases for fatalism, and some corresponding ways that a 
fatalistic conclusion could be evaded.71  As Rhoda explains, a settled future (that is, a future that 
is not open) does not, of itself, entail a fated future. 
 In asserting that the universe is a transtemporal totality, the issue to which my view might 
be supposed to be subject is what Rhoda calls ontic fatalism.  According to Rhoda, the road to 
ontic fatalism begins with the claim that there is “a complete, non-branching series of future 
events”.  The assertion that the universe is a transtemporal totality—without further 
explanation—may seem to entail this picture.  In contrast, there should be no impression that my 
approach is liable to the other roads to fatalism that Rhoda identifies.  For instance, in denying 
strict causal determinism, my view is not subject to causal fatalism, and in denying the dualistic 
view of God and creation, my view is not subject to any sort of theistic/theological fatalism (here 
Rhoda identifies two varieties, the epistemic and the providential).  Therefore, if my view 
escapes the ontic road to fatalism, then my view escapes fatalism altogether. 
                                                
71 Alan Rhoda, “The Roads to Fatalism”. 
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 I suspect that Rhoda and others familiar with his classification scheme may be inclined to 
class my view under the category of the “settled-future response” (for escaping fatalistic 
conclusions).  I would not be altogether unhappy with this assessment, but I do believe that it is 
closer to the truth to say that my view is a hitherto unidentified (and hence, by Rhoda, 
unclassified) version of the “open-future response”.  In this latter category, Rhoda lists 
presentism and the growing-block theory, both of which I reject.  Rhoda also lists in this category 
(citing McCall) the view that multiple concrete causally possible futures exist.  Although I am 
sympathetic with the multiple-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, I am not, in the 
present discussion, assuming the reality of multiple concrete temporal branches.  I intend what I 
say here to hold good even if this is not the case. 
 The difficulty with premise 5 is, in part, a consequence of ambiguity in its key terms (the 
terms ‘determinate’, ‘open’, and most particularly, ‘future’).  This ambiguity is manifest at 
different levels.  For instance, there is a sense of open that is properly associated even with what 
Rhoda calls the settled-future response, for in this case the future is open in the sense of not 
fated, in the sense of not determined ahead of time, in the sense of not already settled.  I think 
that, with reference to the way that the term ‘open’ is commonly used in the context of 
discussions about the future, the foregoing descriptions of the status of the future are sufficiently 
strong to merit the use of the term.  Perhaps this usage is to be discouraged, however, for we do 
want to avoid blurring the important distinction nicely explicated by Rhoda.  Nevertheless, it is 
sure that the view that I advocate recognizes that the future is open in at least this more modest 
sense, and perhaps this is enough for practical purposes.  But let us see if I cannot defend the 
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truth also of my claim that the future is open in a stronger sense, in a deeper sense, in a sense that 
is properly classed as an open-future response in Rhoda’s typology.72 
 I now turn to reveal more explicitly why the argument for inconsistency (between the 
notion of the Totality and the notion of an open future) fails. 
 
 
Refutation of the Charge 
 
 
 
 Of the five premises included in the argument for inconsistency, I have, so far, affirmed 
three and declared two problematic.  In order to defeat the argument for inconsistency, I must 
find at least one of these premises to be false or meaningless.  But which one?  As I have already 
illustrated, valid and apparently sound arguments can be made for both of them. 
 My response hinges on the issue of interpretation.  I just noted that there are important 
ambiguities in the key terms of these premises.  Related to this is the issue of the temporal 
perspective from which these premises are understood and assessed.  These factors are so 
significant in this case that they do not merely affect subtle shades of meaning; no, they alter the 
very truth-values of the premises themselves.  Moreover, there is, in this case, a decisive 
equivocation that generally goes unrecognized. 
 By temporal perspective, I mean the when of any locus of observation, action, judgment, 
et cetera.  There are two important classes of temporal perspective, the intratemporal and the 
transtemporal.  There are indefinitely many intratemporal perspectives, but, as I am using the 
                                                
72 Of course, this stronger sense of openness is still not an unqualified openness, for reality is continuous.  This 
means that the future is—even now—constrained to be continuous with the portion of the spatiotemporal continuum 
that precedes it, that is, the past.  However, from this single background, many paths may seamlessly follow.  (In 
this connection, recall William James’s point [in “The Dilemma of Determinism”] that either his walking home by 
way of Oxford Street or his walking home by way of Divinity Avenue would flow continuously out of his present 
position before the fork, where and when he finds himself contemplating which way it is to be tonight.  Both ways 
seem possible to him, and both ways, he believes, really are possible.) 
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term, only one transtemporal standpoint.  Note that I speak of the transtemporal standpoint, for 
the transtemporal standpoint is not a perspective per se.  It is not temporally situated, but rather, 
is inclusive of all time.  The transtemporal standpoint is the standpoint of the Totality, and I have 
said enough, for our present purposes, of the nature of the Totality in my discussion of premise 1 
(in Section I).  Let me just re-emphasize, then, that from the transtemporal standpoint, there is no 
arising, abiding, or ceasing.  Indeed, there is no passage or change of any kind, only eternal 
presence.  It should be evident that the terms ‘past’ and ‘future’ have no meaning in this 
instance.  (Accordingly, the Totality has no future.  But it is not worried about it.) 
 Let us now reconsider premise 4, that if all temporal portions of the universe are 
determinate, then the future is determinate.  With the foregoing background, what are we to 
make of premise 4? 
 The first point to note is that the antecedent of premise 4, that all temporal portions of the 
universe are determinate, makes its claim with reference to the transtemporal standpoint.  (This 
is true also of the entirety of the first three premises of the argument for inconsistency.)  What 
about the consequent of premise 4, that the future is determinate?  Well, we just finished noting 
that, from the transtemporal standpoint, the notion of the future has no meaning.  The future is a 
relative notion that is meaningful only with reference to some intratemporal perspective.  So, can 
we just conclude that premise 4 is meaningless, and declare mission accomplished?  No, I am 
sure that careful readers would pronounce this a mere verbal subterfuge.  And they would, in the 
following sense, be right.  For can we not say that by the future, as we are using the notion in this 
context, we mean simply that which is future relative to us? (or to any intratemporal 
perspective)?  And, in so saying, can we not still intend to refer to a reach of time that is, 
considered transtemporally, simply a temporal portion of the universe?  Yes, we can. 
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 But when we do this, what is the significance of what we are saying?  From which 
temporal perspective do we speak?  Although the act of speaking is itself always an 
intratemporal act, in this case this intratemporal act makes reference to the transtemporal 
standpoint.  On this interpretation, then, both the antecedent and the consequent of premise 4 are 
asserted with reference to the transtemporal standpoint.  So interpreted, premise 4 is true. 
 But have we really said anything about the future?  No!  It is, rather, as though we had 
said, not premise 4 (in its more natural interpretation), but instead: “If all temporal portions of 
the universe are determinate, then this latter temporal portion of the universe is determinate.”  
This claim, although of course true, is entirely aloof to any reference to the future per se at all.  
Let us say that it is about the “future”, where we put the term ‘future’ in quotes.  Therefore, any 
further claims that follow from premise 4, interpreted in this fashion, will not be about the future 
per se either.  They will be about the “future”.  Let us call this notion of future “the future 
(TTC)”, for transtemporally considered.  The contrast to the future (TTC)—what I just called 
“the future per se”—is the future intratemporally considered.  Let us call this “the future (ITC)”. 
 Is there a way to interpret premise 4 from an intratemporal perspective?  Yes, there is.  In 
this instance, the antecedent remains, of course, a transtemporal statement, but the consequent is 
interpreted intratemporally.  And what does this yield?  It yields the assertion that if all temporal 
portions of the universe are determinate (same as before), then the future (ITC) is determinate.  
And is this true?  No!  Indeed, from this perspective, the future does not even exist yet and, a 
fortiori, is not determinate yet. 
 So, intratemporally considered, premise 4 is false, and so, with premise 4 intra-
temporally considered, the argument for inconsistency is not sound.  Therefore, the charge that 
the notion of the Totality is inconsistent with the notion of an open future is refuted, so long as 
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by an open future, one means an open future (ITC).  And, in speaking of the future, it is both 
more natural and more usual to mean the future (ITC). 
 This essentially completes my primary mission articulated at the outset, but maybe just a 
few words more, by way of explanation, will be useful. 
 The first question that might be raised against this is: Why should I give precedence to the 
latter interpretation, the intratemporal interpretation?  The answer is that I do not; I believe that 
the two perspectives are equally important to understanding reality as it is.  Moreover, in 
declaring at the outset that the universe is a transtemporal totality, I have, by implication, already 
committed myself to the view that the future (TTC) is determinate, and, in this sense, not open.  
But this is an implication that I in no way spurn; indeed, this is the way that I believe things are.  
However—and this is a key point—the transtemporal standpoint is not a perspective that 
considers the future as future.  It is not a temporally situated perspective, and only with reference 
to a temporally situated perspective is there a future at all.  Therefore, the intratemporal 
perspective is important too.  And, I maintain, it is the future (ITC) that we expect premise 4 to 
be about.  Indeed, I think that, in certain cases, there is an insidious—because unrecognized—
equivocation between these two senses of future.  What results is that the validity and soundness 
of the argument for inconsistency—insofar as it is made with reference to the future (TTC)—is 
mistaken for the validly and soundness of the argument with reference to the future (ITC). 
 I do not think that Rhoda makes this error, so perhaps my point is—vis-à-vis Rhoda—in 
some measure a verbal issue.  But not entirely. 
 Although I reject some aspects of the A-theory, I do believe that proponents of the A-
theory are pointing to a critically important truth when they insist upon the special significance 
of the temporal notions of past and future.  To my view, this special significance falls not to the 
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terms themselves, for I do believe, consonant with the B-theory, that these terms are convertible 
into the B-series terms ‘earlier-than’ and ‘later-than’, so long as it is recognized that these terms 
require an intratemporal reference.  The point about which the A-theorists are right, however, is 
that the notions of the past and the future indicate something of great ontological significance.  
The present is dependent upon the past, but it is not dependent upon the future.  This can be 
indicated just as well, and in a way that is more obviously general, by saying that the later is 
dependent upon the earlier, but the earlier is not dependent upon the later.  In either way of its 
expression, the essential point remains the same: there is a crucially important directionality to 
the spatiotemporal continuum.73  The basis for this—the basis for the directionality of time—is 
this order of dependence.74  This means that, from the perspective of any intratemporal moment, 
the past could not be other than it is (for were the past other than it is, this moment, being 
dependent upon the past, would not exist).  The case is very different with respect to the future.  
Indeed, from the perspective of any intratemporal moment, the future does not exist.75 
 This last claim may sound radical, for it implies that the notion of existence is a relative 
notion.  Perhaps, however, it will seem less radical when it is remembered that common speech 
points, in its own way, to this temporal relativity of the notion of existence with such expressions 
as “does not exist yet” and “does not exist now, but will exist later”.  The relativity of the notion 
of existence that I here assert is just the relativity that is indicated by such expressions; it is 
simply the relativity of the notion of existence with reference to temporal perspective.  Of 
course, common belief understands this, not as the temporal relativity of the notion of existence, 
but rather, as a supposed alteration of the existential status of things.  Even so, the feature of 
                                                
73 Of course, not everyone would express this point in terms of a spatiotemporal continuum. 
74 See my “The Basis for the Directionality of Time”, Chronos, Volume IX, 2008. 
75 If it is objected that, by my own admission, there is a sense in which the future does exist, my reply is: Yes, from 
the transtemporal standpoint, the future (TTC) exists, but I am here speaking, from the intratemporal perspective, of 
the future (ITC). 
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reality that these respective approaches express, in their various ways, is the same.  This feature 
of reality is notoriously difficult to consistently characterize.76 
 Finally, since determinacy goes with existence, determinacy is also, in this way, a 
relative notion.  Therefore, there is no ultimate contradiction in asserting that, although the future 
(TTC) is determinate, the future (ITC) is not determinate.77 
 Let us now, as our last move, reconsider premise 5, that if the future is determinate, then 
the future is not open. 
 In this case, the term ‘future’—and with it, the suggestion of an intratemporal 
perspective—appears in both the antecedent and the consequent.  Even so, as in the case of 
premise 4, we can still render a transtemporal interpretation of the whole of premise 5, yielding: 
if the future (TTC) is determinate, then the future (TTC) is not open.  So interpreted, premise 5 is 
true.  Along with what has already been said of the first four premises, this means that, 
transtemporally considered, all of the premises of the argument for inconsistency are true.  
Therefore, being valid, the argument for inconsistency, interpreted transtemporally, is sound.  
Therefore, if the universe is a transtemporal totality, then the future (TTC) is not open. 
 The foregoing explains the strong intuition of soundness that many of us feel when we 
encounter the argument for inconsistency.  But as should be evident by now, the foregoing 
demonstration of soundness, such as it is, does not defeat my central contention in this essay. 
 What if premise 5 is interpreted, in whole or in part, from an intratemporal perspective?  
In this instance, the situation is a bit complicated, for there are several possible permutations.  
Even so, I must be brief.  In short, if the intratemporal perspective is maintained throughout (and 
I think that this is the most natural interpretation), then the premise is true.  But, in this case, the 
                                                
76 Cf. McTaggart.  Also, cf. Nagarjuna’s tetralemma. 
77 My thanks to Prof. John Lachs in this connection (as in all things) for helpful discussions regarding the issue of 
the determinacy of the future. 
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antecedent, that the future (ITC) is determinate, is false (this was the reason for the failure of 
premise 4), so the consequent is not entailed.  Meanwhile, if the intratemporal perspective is not 
maintained throughout, if, for instance, the antecedent is interpreted transtemporally, then the 
antecedent is true, but, in this case, the premise is false: it is not the case that if the future (TTC) 
is determinate, then the future (ITC) is not open.  The final possible permutation is: if the future 
(ITC) is determinate, then the future (TTC) is not open.  In this case, the premise is true but the 
antecedent is false (again, this was the reason for the failure of premise 4), so the consequent is 
not entailed. 
 In sum, any interpretation of premise 5 made, in whole or in part, from an intratemporal 
perspective issues in a failure of entailment of the consequent, either through the falsehood of the 
premise, or through the falsehood of the antecedent.  In any case, the argument for inconsistency 
is defeated. 
 I have now shown that the argument for inconsistency can be refuted either by way of 
premise 4 or by way of premise 5, provided that the respective premise is interpreted (even 
partially) from an intratemporal perspective.  I have also indicated why an intratemporal 
interpretation of these premises is generally the fitting interpretation.  Therefore, I have now 
demonstrated that the argument for inconsistency is no obstacle to my contention that the notion 
of the transtemporal Totality is consistent with the notion of an open future. 
 Here is the bottom line: 
 From the transtemporal standpoint, what is future relative to some intratemporal 
perspective is not open, but of course, from the transtemporal standpoint, there is no future, open 
or otherwise.  Thus, to inquire whether the future is open from the transtemporal standpoint is a 
misplaced question.  Meanwhile, from any perspective for which there is a future, and from 
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which it is therefore meaningful to inquire about the status of the future—that is, from any 
intratemporal perspective—the future is open. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 
 
 
 
Spinoza and Hume on the Issue of Human Freedom 
 
 
 
 The issue of human freedom is among the perennial concerns of philosophy.  Hume 
speaks of one aspect of this issue as “…the most contentious question, of metaphysics, the most 
contentious science…”78  Of course, the term ‘freedom’ is used in a variety of contexts, and has 
correspondingly different significations.  In ordinary discourse, the term ‘freedom’ frequently 
appears in political contexts, where it generally refers to the absence of political oppression.  In 
many philosophical discussions of freedom, however, the term ‘freedom’ is used in a rather 
different sense, pertaining to what is often called “free will.”  Here we are concerned with human 
freedom in both these and other senses. 
 One of the significant philosophical controversies concerning human freedom is 
sometimes referred to as the “free will versus determinism” debate.  This way of construing the 
controversy is unfortunate, for it confounds two oppositions that are better kept separate.  Let us 
clearly distinguish, then, the opposition between determinism and indeterminism, on the one 
hand, and that between freedom and constraint, on the other. 
 The opposition between determinism and indeterminism pertains to the nature of the 
connection that is supposed to exist between earlier and later portions of the temporal sequence.  
                                                
78 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 41. 
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Determinists maintain that the specific character of later portions of the temporal sequence is 
strictly fixed by the character of earlier portions.  Ordinarily, this rigid connection is said to be 
effected by causation.  Often cited as an exemplar of this doctrine is Pierre Laplace’s famous 
remark that if a powerful intelligence were informed of the exact position and momentum of 
every particle in the universe at any given moment, this intelligence would know with certainty 
the state of things at every other moment, past or future.  Indeterminists, in contrast, deny the 
claim of determinism.  Stated positively, indeterminism is the view that the future is “open”, that 
more than one alternative future is genuinely possible.  The related term ‘fatalism’, although 
sometimes used simply as a synonym of ‘determinism’, is, more generally, the notion that certain 
events are destined to occur, regardless of the actions that might be taken prior to their 
occurrence.  In this latter sense, fatalism is compatible with indeterminism, for the claim, in this 
instance, is only that certain events will necessarily or inevitably occur, not that the entire 
temporal sequence is always already a settled fact. 
 The opposition between freedom and constraint is less clear-cut.  This is in part because, 
as we just indicated, the term ‘freedom’ is used in different senses in both common and technical 
discourse.  Moreover, as James notes, the term ‘freedom’ is a eulogistic word.  It is not 
surprising, then, that philosophers of quite divers theoretical orientations proclaim the truth of 
freedom, and so far agree, at least nominally, on this score.79  Any proposed stipulative definition 
of ‘freedom’ is, therefore, liable to be prejudicial to one theoretical orientation or another.  Of 
course, freedom and constraint can each be defined as the negation of the other, but this, by 
itself, does not get us too far.  One of our aims in the forthcoming discussion is to elucidate some 
                                                
79 William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism”, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 
Dover, p. 149. 
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of the varying senses in which this familiar but ambiguous opposition has been understood and 
interpreted.  Accordingly, we leave this opposition merely named for now. 
 Those who speak of the free will versus determinism debate sometimes suppose that 
determinism entails constraint, at least in some relevantly important sense, and that, therefore, 
the existence of human freedom, in its corresponding sense, requires the truth of 
indeterminism.80  Against this view, several prominent philosophers have maintained that 
freedom and determinism are compatible.81  Although opposed in many ways in both method 
and doctrine, Spinoza and Hume are both compatibilists in this sense.  It is thus interesting and 
instructive to compare their respective approaches to the issue of human freedom. 
 In what follows, we briefly review Hume on human freedom, then Spinoza, and then do 
some comparison and evaluation of these two figures. 
 
 
Hume’s Approach to Human Freedom 
 
 
 
 Hume is, generally speaking, the most resolutely empirical and skeptical of the principal 
modern Empiricists.  Hume is famous for his insistence that we have no legitimate justification 
for asserting that there is a necessary connection between objects or events in supposed causal 
relation.  In contrast, some of Hume’s predecessors and contemporaries understood causation as 
a kind of force or power, a force or power that acts of necessity.  It is this account of causation 
that Hume denies.  Based upon his empiricist principles, and especially, upon his claim that 
                                                
80 Insofar as the term ‘freedom’ (or ‘liberty’) is used simply as a synonym for ‘indeterminism’, this is, of course, 
analytically true.  There is thus an aspect of the controversy surrounding the issue of freedom that is merely verbal, 
as Hume correctly indicates (Hume states the point rather more strongly than this, as we shall see).  Even so, pace 
Hume, those who assert the incompatibility of freedom and determinism generally mean (or at least think that they 
mean) something more significant than this.  In any event, there are important practical considerations connected 
with both personal and political freedom that are by no means merely verbal in character. 
81 This doctrine is, reasonably enough, often entitled “compatibilism”, but this term is itself ambiguous, for it 
sometimes refers instead to the related doctrine that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible. 
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“…all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions…”,82 Hume maintains that the only 
idea that we legitimately have of causation is that which we derive from experience.  In this 
connection, Hume says: 
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of 
causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary 
connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an 
infallible consequence of the other.  We only find, that the one does actually, in 
fact, follow the other.  The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in 
the second.  This is the whole that appears to the outward senses.  The mind feels 
no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, 
there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which 
can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.83 
Hume concludes that: 
…we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are 
absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical 
reasonings, or common life.84 
All that we see in experience is a constant conjunction between certain kinds of objects or 
events, and, based upon this constant conjunction and the force of habit or custom, we conclude 
that certain antecedent events cause certain consequent events.  There is no more to causation 
than this. 
 Much of the confusion associated with the notion of causation is an artifact of an 
atomistic view of objects and events, and the associated notion that there is a dichotomy, perhaps 
                                                
82 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 41. 
83 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 41. 
84 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 49. 
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even a discontinuity, between supposed causes and effects.85  It is to bridge this supposed gap 
that the notion of causation as a kind of force or power is invoked.  Hume, although correct 
insofar as he is dismissing the notion of causation as an occult power, is as much a victim of this 
misguided way of thinking as are his opponents.  Indeed, with reference to his talk of a 
“succession of objects”, one might charge Hume with not taking his empiricism far enough.  
Hume seems to assume that we have direct access to objects through experience.  It is closer to 
the truth to say that supposed objects are merely theoretical posits; in any event, objects are not 
immediately given empirically.86 
 In the context of his discussion of liberty and necessity,87 we find certain remarks by 
Hume that are difficult to reconcile with his foregoing account of causation.  In this latter 
context, Hume says: 
It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a 
necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could 
possibly have resulted from it.88 
Here Hume speaks of a “necessary force”, the very sort of thing that he asserted, in the previous 
section, that we have no idea of at all, and that is, therefore, a mere meaningless locution.  How 
are we to take this?  Perhaps Hume is not including himself as among those by whom this claim 
is universally allowed, or perhaps he is merely speaking here after the usual fashion, not finding 
                                                
85 Cf. the Buddhist notion of pratitya-samutpada (dependent origination). 
86 Cf. the Buddhist notion of emptiness (shunyata).  William James seems to have something similar in mind in his 
“radical empiricism” and “philosophy of pure experience”. 
87 Hume treats of this issue most especially in his A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Part 3, Section 1: “Of liberty 
and necessity”, Section 2: “The same subject continu’d”, and Section 3: “Of the influencing motives of the will”, 
and again in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 8: “Of Liberty and Necessity”.  Given 
Hume’s remark that he would prefer to be interpreted based upon his Enquiry, we draw most extensively from this 
latter work. 
88 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 54. 
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it important in this context to be so careful with his terminology.  The remark comes on the heels 
of what seems to be Hume’s central thesis of the section, to wit: 
I hope…to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of 
necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on 
these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon 
words.89 
Hume does straightaway reiterate his considered doctrine on causation, saying: 
Our idea…of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity, 
observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly 
conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from 
the appearance of the other.  These two circumstances form the whole of that 
necessity, which we ascribe to matter.  Beyond the constant conjunction of similar 
objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of 
any necessity, or connexion.90 
In any event, Hume does seem in this context to claim that we are properly sure of the perfect 
regularity of causal relations (or “the constant conjunction of similar objects”), even though we 
are not sure of this by virtue of any a priori justification, but simply through experience.  This is 
a remarkable claim for an empiricist to make, given that we never find such perfect regularity in 
experience.  Hume acknowledges this fact (“such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no 
part of nature”),91 but explains it in terms of confounding factors.  The bottom line seems to be 
that although Hume endorses a rather deflated sense of necessity, he nonetheless believes that 
                                                
89 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 54. 
90 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, pp. 54-55. 
91 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 57. 
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later events are strictly determined by earlier conditions, which precludes the possibility of an 
open future. 
 Hume next moves to claim that this regularity in matter is paralleled in human action, 
saying: “…we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the 
operations of body.”92  Moreover: 
…were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment, which 
we could form of this kind, irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect 
any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however 
accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose.93 
Hume speaks as though the determination of human actions were an all-or-nothing affair: either 
strict determination or utter chaos.  This surely seems to be a false dilemma.  Might there not be 
general trends, despite the lack of strict and unqualified determination?  Moreover, all that is 
required for probable inference (and, on his own principles, Hume can expect nothing more with 
regard to matters of fact) is that there be such general trends.  A certain ambivalence concerning 
this point appears in the text, as when Hume speaks of “a degree of uniformity and regularity”94 
and again of “a certain degree of uniformity”.95  However, it is evident in the context of these 
expressions that Hume is again simply acknowledging that confounding factors are often present, 
and that such factors can impede our ability to detect the strict determination.  The appearance of 
irregularity is thus, for Hume, simply a consequence of our ignorance; strict determination, he 
seems to insist, is nonetheless operative. 
                                                
92 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 56. 
93 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 56. 
94 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 57.  [Italics added] 
95 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 63.  [Italics added] 
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 Having affirmed the truth of determinism, human freedom or liberty, according to Hume, 
is simply the ability to do what we will.  Hume says: 
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to 
the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if 
we choose to move, we also may.  Now this hypothetical liberty is universally 
allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prisoner and in chains.96 
Clearly, freedom conceived in this sense is compatible with strict determinism.  Indeed, in 
Hume’s view, it is dependent upon it.  Moreover, Hume also claims that, despite philosophical 
and popular opinion to the contrary, strict determination in the sphere of human action is 
requisite for authentic moral culpability, and hence also for legitimate praise and blame.  Did 
human actions not arise invariably as a consequence of character, says Hume, punishment would 
be neither practically efficacious nor morally sound, for the recipient of the punishment would be 
in no wise responsible for the actions of the perpetrator, although he be conventionally 
considered the same person. 
 A libertarian critic of Hume’s conclusions in this connection would distinguish between 
freedom of will, on the one hand, and freedom to act in accordance with will, on the other.  In his 
defense of the compatibility of liberty and necessity, Hume is considering liberty, that is, 
freedom, in the latter sense, not the former.  From a libertarian perspective, however, this is to 
miss the point entirely.  The libertarian is concerned with something more than Hume’s 
hypothetical liberty.  We consider this point further in the final section of this chapter. 
 
                                                
96 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 63. 
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Spinoza’s Approach to Human Freedom 
 
 
 
 Spinoza’s philosophical work is impressively comprehensive, systematic, and unifying.  
In contrast to his Rationalist predecessor Descartes, Spinoza is a monist with respect to 
substance.  According to Spinoza, “there can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.”97  
Spinoza famously equates God and Nature, two notions that Western scholastic philosophy had 
considered quite distinct.  Meanwhile, mind and body, although different attributes, are both 
attributes of the one substance God or Nature.  Individuals are modes of this substance.  
Accordingly, human beings are not merely in Nature but are (a part) of Nature.98  Spinoza 
derides those who believe otherwise, saying: 
They appear to go so far as to conceive man in Nature as a kingdom within a 
kingdom.  They believe that he disturbs rather than follows Nature’s order, and 
has absolute power over his actions, and is determined by no other source than 
himself.99 
Moreover, since Nature is God, it is just as true to say that human beings are a part of God.  This 
means that human perceptions and other ideas are not other than God’s ideas, as follows: 
…the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; and therefore when we 
say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing else but this: 
that God—not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is explicated through the 
                                                
97 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 14, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 224. 
98 This recognition has endeared Spinoza to many environmental philosophers. 
99 Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Preface, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 277.  Cf. Spinoza, Political 
Treatise, Chapter 2, Section 6, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 684. 
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nature of the human mind, that is, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the 
human mind—has this or that idea.100 
Even so, this does not mean that supposed finite individuals are, in truth, simply identical to 
God, as is claimed, for instance, by the Upanishadic mahavakya (great utterance) Tat tvam asi 
(That art thou), at least as it is interpreted by Advaita (non-dual) Vedantins.  Thus, although 
Spinoza is monist with respect to substance, he is a pluralist with respect to modes.  In this way, 
Spinoza reconciles his monistic philosophy with the world as we know it, and provides a solution 
to the ancient problem of the one and the many. 
 According to Spinoza, although modes are dependent upon God for their being, they are 
nonetheless discrete and concretely real.  A useful contrast to draw out the sense of this view is 
the Buddhist notion of anatman (no-abiding-self).  Buddhists refer to views of Spinoza’s type 
regarding the individual as svabhava doctrines (usually translated, in English, by the term 
‘essentialism’).  It is in this sense that Spinoza, in affirming the concrete reality of individuals, is 
properly regarded an essentialist, although it should be added in the same breath that he is 
decidedly not an essentialist in one of the usual senses of this term as it is used in medieval 
Western philosophy.  That is, Spinoza is not an essentialist in the sense of endorsing fixed, 
unchanging essences as the basis of individual identity through change.  In Spinoza, this latter 
form of essentialism is replaced by his notion of conatus, the endeavor of each individual to 
preserve its own being.101  This is a decidedly different notion, in that conatus is dynamic and 
subject to change, while, according to the usual Western medieval notions of essence, essence is 
static and fixed.  (We belabor this point here because this understanding will be important when 
we turn to speak more directly of Spinoza on human freedom.) 
                                                
100 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 11, Corollary, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 250. 
101 Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Proposition 7, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 283. 
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 Spinoza is a strict determinist.  According to Spinoza, there is no unqualified 
contingency: “Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine 
nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way.”102  Spinoza emphatically restates this 
point as follows: 
…I have here shown more clearly than the midday sun that in things there is 
absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be said to be “contingent”…a 
thing is termed “contingent” for no other reason than the deficiency of our 
knowledge.103 
Therefore, nothing exists except that which necessarily exists.  Furthermore, nothing is possible 
except that which actually exists.  There is thus, in Spinoza’s system, a collapse of the traditional 
modalities, in that, for Spinoza, nothing is possible that is not actual, and nothing is actual that is 
not necessary. 
 Despite the apparently unconditional and even strident denial of contingency expressed in 
the foregoing quoted passages and elsewhere, there are places where Spinoza seems to affirm 
contingency, as here: “…all particular things are contingent and perishable.”104  However, 
Spinoza straightaway explains, in this same passage, “what is to be understood by contingency 
and perishability”, namely, that “we can have no adequate knowledge of their [particular things] 
duration”.  Spinoza here references the Scholium from which we quote above, where he 
concludes that “…a thing is termed ‘contingent’ for no other reason than the deficiency of our 
knowledge.”  We term a thing “contingent” or “possible”, then, simply because we do not know 
                                                
102 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 29, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 234. 
103 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, Scholium 1, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 236. 
104 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 31, Corollary, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 263.  See 
also Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Definitions 3 and 4, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 322. 
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whether it exists (and is hence necessary), on the one hand, or is impossible, on the other.105  
Spinoza says: “…apart from this there is no other kind of contingency.”106  It is this 
uncompromising necessitarianism that provokes writers such as William James to charge 
Spinoza with endorsing a “block-universe” account of reality.  This attribution is controversial, 
however, so we shall revisit it in the final section of this chapter. 
 Based upon his strictly deterministic view of reality, one might suppose that Spinoza 
rejects the notion of human freedom,107 and in a sense, he does.  Spinoza says: 
…men believe that they are free, precisely because they are conscious of their 
volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined them to 
desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are ignorant 
of them.108 
If we believe that we are free in the sense that our volitions and desires are undetermined by 
anything beyond themselves, we are mistaken.  Likewise, if we believe that we are free in the 
sense that we could do otherwise than we actually do, we are mistaken.  Freedom in these and 
related senses is illusory.  The illusion is a consequence of our ignorance of the “chain of 
causes”109 that determine our volitions and desires, and that determine, likewise, our actions. 
 Despite Spinoza’s rejection of freedom in the senses just adumbrated, however, it would 
be a serious error to suppose that he denies freedom outright.  On the contrary, Spinoza endorses 
the notion of human freedom as he understands it, and gives considerable attention to its 
explication.  Insofar as freedom is understood as the contrary of necessity, freedom is indeed 
                                                
105 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, Scholium 1, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 236. 
106 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 31, Corollary, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 263. 
107 Incompatibilists, at any rate, might suppose this, whether they be libertarians or hard determinists. 
108 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Appendix, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 239. 
109 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, Scholium 1, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 236. 
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impossible.  However, freedom in its true and proper sense, according to Spinoza, is the contrary 
not of necessity but of bondage.  Of bondage, in this sense, Spinoza says: 
I assign the term “bondage” to man’s lack of power to control and check the 
emotions.  For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is 
subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although 
he sees it better course, to pursue the worse.110 
To be in bondage, then, is to lack control of one’s emotions, particularly one’s disturbing and 
destructive emotions.  On the contrary, “…a free man is he who is guided solely by reason.”111  
This kind of freedom, according to Spinoza, is both possible and highly valuable.  Accordingly, 
Spinoza is properly classed as a compatibilist with reference to determinism and human freedom, 
so long as it is recognized that it is freedom in this latter sense only in which they are correctly 
understood to be compatible. 
 Spinoza’s reference to the notion that a person can be “at the mercy of his emotions” and 
hence be “compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse” is reminiscent of 
the ancient Greek notion of akrasia (weakness of will).  In this way, Spinoza is closer to 
Aristotle than to Plato in his assessment of the human condition vis-à-vis the relation of 
knowledge and action.  For Spinoza, true freedom, in the sense that it is possible, is not a 
birthright, but a difficult achievement.  It is to be achieved by mastering the passions through a 
deeper and more complete kind of knowledge wherein inadequate ideas are replaced by 
adequate ideas.  However, Spinoza does not maintain that all emotions are bad; on the contrary, 
some emotions are good.  In this connection, Spinoza distinguishes between passive and active 
emotions: 
                                                
110 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Preface, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 320. 
111 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 68, Proof, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 355. 
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Desires that follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood 
through it alone are those that are related to the mind insofar as the mind is 
conceived as consisting of adequate ideas.  The other desires are related to the 
mind only insofar as it conceives things inadequately; and their force and increase 
must be defined not by human power but by the power of things external to us.  
So the former are rightly called active emotions, the latter passive emotions.  For 
the former always indicate our power, the latter our weakness and fragmentary 
knowledge.112 
This is a dense paragraph, summarizing much that is explicated in detail in preceding 
propositions and associated text.  For our present purposes, we are concerned most to note that 
while passive emotions thwart human freedom, active emotions can be supportive of it.  Active 
emotions are consonant with reason and arise wholly from our own nature, while passive 
emotions are often dissonant with reason and do not arise wholly from our own nature. 
 In none of this is it Spinoza’s aim to excoriate human individuals, or even to disparage 
human actions.  This point is evident throughout the latter parts of the Ethics, and is summarized 
nicely here in his Political Treatise: 
…I have taken great care not to deride, bewail, or execrate human actions, but to 
understand them.  So I have regarded human emotions such as love, hatred, anger, 
envy, pride, pity, and other agitations of the mind not as vices of human nature 
but as properties pertaining to it…113 
                                                
112 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Appendix, Paragraph 2, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 358. 
113 Spinoza, Political Treatise, Chapter 1, Section 4, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 681. 
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Even so, some things are good in the sense that they are “useful to us”, and some things are bad 
in the sense that they are “an obstacle to our attainment of some good”.114  The intent of these 
ascriptions, however, is not to praise or blame.  They are simply useful labels for whatever 
assists us in, or thwarts us from, “our approaching nearer to the model of human nature that we 
set before ourselves”.115  For example, unhappiness and related emotions are bad in this sense, in 
addition to being disagreeable.  It is useful, then, to diagnose the cause of such passive emotions, 
that we might more easily find a remedy.  For instance: 
…it should be noted that emotional distress and unhappiness have their origin 
especially in excessive love toward a thing subject to considerable instability, a 
thing which we can never completely possess.116 
It is interesting to note the parallels between this remark and the basic Buddhist assessment of 
the human condition wherein duhkha (distress and discontent) is attributed to attachment to what 
is impermanent, and wherein liberation from this duhkha is said to require wisdom and the 
consequent quelling of this attachment.  Moreover, according to both the Buddhists and Spinoza, 
this path to freedom or salvation, although difficult, is nonetheless possible to traverse.  We 
should not expect it to be easy, for, as Spinoza concludes his Ethics: “All things excellent are as 
difficult as they are rare.”117 
 A key feature of Spinoza’s approach to human flourishing is his developmental account 
of human freedom.  For Spinoza, freedom is an active and dynamic undertaking, mirroring the 
active and dynamic character of conatus.  True freedom, then, is not simply a lack of obstacles to 
one’s existing inclinations.  Spinoza says: 
                                                
114 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Definitions 1 and 2, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett editions, p. 322. 
115 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Preface, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett editions, p. 322. 
116 Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 20, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 373. 
117 Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 42, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 382. 
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…the majority appear to think that they are free to the extent that they can indulge 
their lusts, and that they are giving up their rights to the extent that they are 
required to live under the commandments of the divine law.118 
Spinoza here speaks in the idiom of Hebraic theology, but the reference to living “under the 
commandments of the divine law” is, for Spinoza, just another way of saying “in harmony with 
the order of the whole of Nature”.119  This latter manner of speaking is consonant with Taoist 
language, through which it is said that human flourishing is achieved by living in harmony with 
the Tao or Nature.  In keeping with the biblical language, however, true freedom, far from being 
simply the indulgence of one’s lusts, is the harmonizing of one’s inclinations with the divine law, 
and this we achieve, ultimately, through the intellectual love of God.  This intellectual love of 
God is just as much God’s love toward us as it is our love toward God; indeed, these are in truth 
one and the same: 
From this we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or freedom 
consists, namely, in the constant and eternal love toward God, that is, in God’s 
love toward men.120 
In the final analysis, then, our love of God is God’s love of himself through a part of himself, and 
it is in this that true freedom, which is the same as salvation or blessedness, consists. 
 Spinoza provides an admirable account of human freedom within the context of his 
strictly deterministic view of reality.  Spinoza’s account makes it clear that even if determinism 
were true, there would still be a significant sense in which humans could be said to be free.  
From a libertarian perspective, however, there is an important kind of freedom that is altogether 
                                                
118 Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 41, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 381. 
119 Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Appendix, Paragraph 32, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 362. 
120 Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 36, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 378. 
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lacking in Spinoza’s system.  We say more about this point in the next section, after we make a 
few explicit comparisons between Spinoza and Hume on the issue of human freedom. 
 
 
Comparison and Evaluation 
 
 
 
 Despite their rather different methods and assumptions, Spinoza and Hume agree on 
several important points concerning human freedom.  First, they both endorse strict determinism.  
Even so, second, they both acknowledge the possibility of human freedom.  Thus, third, they are 
both, each in his own way, compatibilists with reference to the issue of human freedom.  Fourth, 
neither believes in freedom of will, at least in an unqualified sense.  Fifth, they both believe in 
freedom to act in accordance with will.  Thus, sixth, they both, each in his own way, understand 
freedom to mean self-determination.  Seventh, they both believe that freedom to act in 
accordance with will is necessary for individual responsibility.  Moreover, eighth, they both 
believe that freedom to act in accordance with will is sufficient for individual responsibility.  
Hence, ninth, they both believe that lack of freedom in the other sense, unqualified freedom of 
will, is nothing to bemoan.  Indeed, tenth, they both believe that the supposed freedom involved 
in unqualified freedom of will is really the opposite of freedom, viz., mere chance. 
 The foregoing is an impressive list of commonalities between Spinoza and Hume.  
Nonetheless, there are important differences between them as well.  For instance, although they 
both believe that freedom to act in accordance with will is sufficient for individual responsibility, 
Hume takes this to mean that freedom to act in accordance with will is sufficient also for 
legitimate praise and blame.  Meanwhile, Spinoza, in seeking to understand rather than to 
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“deride, bewail, or execrate” human actions,121 generally abjures moralistic notions such as 
praise and blame in favor of a program of consciously directed self-improvement grounded in an 
understanding of the causal bases of the passive emotions.  Through this understanding, 
inadequate ideas are replaced with adequate ideas, and passive emotions are replaced with active 
emotions. 
 Much of the divergence between Spinoza and Hume concerning the issue of human 
freedom appears to be a consequence of their different respective understandings of the roll of 
reason in the economy of human volition and action.  Hume, for his part, operates with a rather 
attenuated sense of the term ‘reason’.  Thus, according to Hume, reason alone has no motive 
power; it neither produces action nor gives rise to volition.  In a famous remark, Hume says: 
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other 
office than to serve and obey them.”122  Spinoza’s view in this connection is quite different from 
that of Hume.  In contrast to Hume’s assertion that reason can only function as the slave of the 
passions, Spinoza emphasizes “…how effective against the emotions is clear and distinct 
knowledge…”123  In this way, Spinoza, contra Hume, expresses a view concerning the role of 
reason and knowledge in the harmony of the soul that is reminiscent of that which Plato develops 
in his Republic. 
 What is the impact of the foregoing difference between Spinoza and Hume on their 
respective notions of freedom?  Although, in the last analysis, neither Spinoza nor Hume can 
properly claim freedom of will, but only freedom to act in accordance with will, Spinoza is 
considerably more sophisticated and subtle in his treatment of this issue.  In Hume’ account, 
freedom to act in accordance with will does not seem to be distinguished from freedom as the 
                                                
121 Spinoza, Political Treatise, Chapter 1, Section 4, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 681. 
122 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford edition, p. 266. 
123 Spinoza, Ethics, Part V, Proposition 20, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 373. 
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ability to indulge one’s inclinations, regardless of whether these inclinations are worthy of 
indulgence.  As far is reason is concerned, the inclinations are simply given.  In contrast, 
Spinoza emphasizes a constructive and developmental account of the individual (as we indicated 
in our earlier discussion of Spinoza’s notion of individual essence, conatus).  According to 
Spinoza, we can intentionally modify our character such that our will itself is changed.  In this 
sense, then, there is for Spinoza a sort of freedom of will as such.  Hume, meanwhile, in 
regarding reason as the mere slave of inclination, lacks the resources of Spinoza in this 
connection.  Therefore, there is in Spinoza a sort of freedom of will that is apparently absent in 
Hume.  Even so, this is decidedly not freedom of will in the libertarian’s sense, as we discuss in 
more detail below, and as Spinoza himself insists: 
In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will.  The mind is determined to this or 
that volition by a cause, which is likewise determined by another cause, and this 
again by another, and so ad infinitum.124 
And again: 
…it is on this account only that men believe themselves to be free, that they are 
conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are 
determined…125 
Nonetheless, Spinoza’s account of human freedom is supportive of personal growth and self-
improvement in a way that Hume’s is not. 
 So much for our explicit comparison of Spinoza and Hume on the issue of human 
freedom.  Let us round out the discussion with a few points of evaluation, beginning with Hume.  
As we indicated in Section I, Hume criticizes the notion, popular among his predecessors and 
                                                
124 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 48, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett Edition, p. 272. 
125 Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Proposition 2, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett Edition, p. 281. 
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contemporaries, that causation involves a necessary connection between objects or events.  It is 
more than a little curious, then, that Hume is nevertheless a strict determinist.  It is especially 
curious given his commitments to empiricism and skepticism, for although we notice all manner 
of regularities in the operation of nature, including ourselves, strict determinism cannot be 
established empirically, for even if strict determinism were true, measurement errors and 
confounding factors would prevent us from ever observing it directly.126  Based simply upon 
empirical results, then, strict determinism can never be more than a posit.127  Therefore, given his 
empiricist principles, Hume should have at least remained uncommitted on the matter of 
determinism.  That he did not calls for some explanation, although no explanation internal to his 
philosophy is evident.  Perhaps Hume was inclined to determinism by the mechanistic view that 
prevailed in his time.  Hume lived before certain developments in modern physics cast doubt 
upon strict determinism by suggesting that there may be an irreducibly stochastic aspect to 
natural processes, even at the level of simple physical dynamics. 
 In the last paragraph of Section I, we intimated that, from a libertarian perspective, 
Hume’s proposed reconciliation between freedom (“liberty”) and determinism (“necessity”) fails 
to address what, to the libertarian, is really the central issue: whether the will itself is free.  We 
have already made use of the distinction that we there introduced between freedom of will, on the 
one hand, and freedom to act in accordance with will, on the other.  It is only freedom in the 
latter sense, what Hume calls hypothetical liberty, that Hume has in mind when he argues for the 
compatibility of liberty and necessity.  Meanwhile, most champions of freedom of will 
(“libertarians”) assert, and most Humean-style compatibilists concede, that freedom of will (or 
                                                
126 Since such deviations from strict regularity are to be expected, they are not treated as falsifiers of the hypothesis 
of strict determinism. 
127 Cf. James: “…evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is…strictly 
impossible to find.”  William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism”, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, Dover, p. 150. 
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freedom in the libertarian sense) is not compatible with determinism.  It is for this reason that the 
term ‘libertarianism’, with its obvious etymological association with ‘liberty’, often serves 
merely as a synonym for ‘indeterminism’.128  As we just noted in the preceding paragraph, Hume 
simply endorses determinism without substantial defense.  From a libertarian perspective, then, 
Hume, in arguing for the compatibility of hypothetical liberty and determinism, is dodging what 
is actually a crucial question in regard to human freedom: whether determinism itself is true.  We 
have now to consider this and related questions more deeply. 
 There are three pivotal questions in connection with the issue of freedom of will: 
(1) Is the thesis of determinism true? 
(2) Is freedom of will compatible with determinism? 
(3) Is freedom of will compatible with indeterminism? 
We addressed one aspect of the second question three paragraphs back, where we explained the 
sort of freedom of will that is compatible with Spinoza’s philosophy.  Another aspect of the 
second question is whether freedom of will in the libertarian’s sense (what we mean when we 
use the term ‘freedom of will’ without qualification) is compatible with determinism.  We have 
suggested in several places that it is not, and generally, both determinists and indeterminists 
agree on this point.  However, before we turn to the other questions, a few more words on this 
point are appropriate here. 
 What is freedom of will?  Naturally, the answer to this question depends, in part, upon 
what is meant by the ambiguous term ‘freedom’ in this context.  According to one familiar 
                                                
128 This can be misleading, for insofar as the term ‘libertarianism’ serves merely as a synonym for ‘indeterminism’, 
the assertion that libertarianism is incompatible with determinism, although true, is trivially so.  However, 
libertarianism is, more expressly, the doctrine that there is freedom of will.  If libertarianism in this express sense is 
incompatible with determinism, it is because freedom of will is incompatible with determinism, and not merely 
because libertarianism is defined as the contrary of determinism. 
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account, an act is free just in case the agent129 could have done otherwise.130  But this 
formulation still contains an ambiguity, since it is unclear how one should take the expression 
‘could have done otherwise’.  On one interpretation, ‘could have done otherwise’ is rendered as 
“would have done otherwise, if the agent had willed otherwise”.  This is, of course, just freedom 
to act in accordance with will, or Hume’s hypothetical liberty, all over again.  Freedom in this 
sense is compatible with determinism, but this is not freedom of will.  Furthermore, from a 
libertarian perspective, the foregoing approach does not even allow real freedom of action, for if 
determinism is true, the antecedent of the foregoing interpretation’s counterfactual conditional is 
not only false, it is impossible (that is, if determinism is true, the agent could not have willed 
otherwise).  Therefore, freedom of will is not compatible with determinism. 
 In light of the foregoing considerations advanced from the libertarian side, it appears that 
the notion of freedom of will, as conceived by the libertarian, is just the notion that the will is not 
strictly determined.  If this is true, then the claim that freedom of will and determinism are 
incompatible is simply a logical truth.  The important factual question with reference to the issue 
of freedom of will, then, is whether the thesis of determinism is true.  Given this analysis, it is no 
surprise that Hume, being a strict determinist, takes the libertarian notion of freedom to be 
incoherent, and therefore takes hypothetical liberty to be the only thing that we can reasonably 
mean by liberty.  According to Hume, we are free, figuratively speaking, so long as we are “not a 
prisoner and in chains”.131  Does determinism involve our being in chains?  Hume apparently 
                                                
129 We here use the term ‘agent’ in a vague and general sense, naming not necessarily an individual in the 
conventional sense, but perhaps a mere moment of decision.  In a way, we are using the term ‘agent’ simply as a 
placeholder for a deeper, but lengthier, account of the matter. 
130 See, for example, Roy C. Weatherford, “freedom and determinism”, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
edited by Ted Honderich, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 292, where this general formulation, expressed in 
different words, is attributed to G. E. Moore.  For a critical discussion of the notion of alternate possibilities, see 
Harry G. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, reprinted in Arguing About Metaphysics, 
edited by Michael C. Rea, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 428-434. 
131 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett edition, p. 63. 
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thinks not.  However, if determinism is true, we are, in a sense, constrained by what Spinoza 
calls the “chain of causes”,132 for we cannot, in any given instance, will otherwise than we 
actually will, or do otherwise than we actually do. 
 Many of the libertarian concerns and criticisms that we have hitherto been discussing in 
the context of our evaluation of Hume’s approach to human freedom apply just as much to 
Spinoza or, for that matter, to any strict determinist.  However, as we have already indicated, 
Spinoza’s account of freedom is significantly more subtle and sophisticated than is that of most 
other determinists, including Hume.  Therefore, we shall focus our evaluation henceforth upon 
Spinoza, on the analogy of defeating the chief wrestler.133  We just noted that the important 
factual question with respect to freedom of will is whether determinism is true.  Of the three 
questions that we list above, there remains also the issue as to whether freedom of will is 
compatible with indeterminism. 
 In Section II of this chapter, we enunciate Spinoza’s commitment to strict determinism, 
and indicate that the sort of contingency that Spinoza does allow is in no wise inconsistent with 
his determinism.  The passages that we there quote in illustration of these points are all drawn 
from his Ethics.  It is instructive to note, by way of comparison, a later remark that Spinoza 
makes with respect to the issue of contingency.  In his Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza 
says: 
We ought to define and explain things through their proximate causes.  
Generalisations about fate and the interconnection of causes can be of no service 
to us in forming and ordering our thoughts concerning particular things.  
Furthermore, we plainly have no knowledge as to the actual co-ordination and 
                                                
132 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 33, Scholium 1, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 236. 
133 This figure is found in Shankara’s Brahma Sutra Bhasya. 
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interconnection of things—that is, the way in which things are in actual fact 
ordered and connected—so that for practical purposes it is better, indeed, it is 
essential, to consider things as contingent.134 
This is a very interesting and telling remark, for so to consider things is, according to Spinoza’s 
earlier work in the Ethics, to consider them falsely.  Furthermore, it is not as though Spinoza has 
changed his position on this point.  Indeed, in the selfsame discourse from which this passage is 
extracted, Spinoza reaffirms his commitment to strict determinism, saying: 
…I grant that, in an absolute sense, all things are determined by the universal laws 
of Nature to exist and to act in a definite and determinate way…135 
It is unusual for any philosopher speaking to philosophers to recommend treating an opinion that 
is held to be false as though it were true.  It is particularly uncharacteristic of Spinoza, who, after 
all, strongly emphasizes the great benefit that accrues to those who believe what is true and who 
act in accordance with true belief.  Therefore, Spinoza’s insistence that, for practical purposes, it 
is not only better, but more, essential, that we consider things as contingent—despite his 
presumption that things, in truth, are not contingent, but only seem contingent to us in our 
ignorance—indicates his recognition of the profound tension that exists between the affirmation 
of strict determinism, on the one hand, and the suppositions and demands of our volitional and 
active economy, on the other.136 
                                                
134 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 4: “Of the Divine Law”, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett 
edition, pp. 426-427.  [Italics added] 
135 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, Chapter 4: “Of the Divine Law”, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett 
edition, p. 426. 
136 Some relief from this tension could perhaps be achieved through the Buddhist device of the “two truths” (satya-
dvaya), wherein absolute or ultimate truth is contrasted with relative or conventional truth.  However, in Buddhist 
contexts, this distinction is deployed for teaching purposes as a “skillful means” (upaya-kausalya) of leading the 
student to deeper understanding.  The device is dropped once true understanding is achieved (according to 
Nagarjuna’s account, the two truths are ultimately non-different).  Spinoza himself, at least, does not seem to 
interpret his teachings in this way. 
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 Naturally, this tension can be resolved by renouncing the claim of strict determinism, or, 
what is the same, accepting the truth of some measure of genuine contingency.137  Is anything 
approximating this approach available to Spinoza?  In this connection, Goodman says: 
Spinoza’s calls to reflection and self-mastery suggest that his own stridency about 
contingency might need to be mitigated somewhat…invoking the Aristotelian 
distinction between the specious notion of alternative pasts and the legitimate 
notion of alternative futures.138 
If this talk of mitigating stridency about contingency were intended as an interpretation of 
Spinoza, it would be rather difficult to sustain.  However, insofar as it is intended as an 
emendation of Spinoza, it is right on the mark.  Despite its virtues, this approach is not open to 
Spinoza himself without a rather substantial and significant remaking of his system.  The 
acceptance of contingency would itself be a significant alteration, and, given the tight logical 
structure of Spinoza’s system, this alteration would require others as well.  Even so, much of 
value in Spinoza’s philosophy could be retained by an indeterminist. 
 This brings us at last back to the “block-universe” charge that we mentioned in the 
middle of Section II, and promised to revisit here.  Although the notion itself is a general 
libertarian concern, the appellation is due to James.  With reference to determinism, James says: 
It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint 
and decree what the other parts shall be.  The future has no ambiguous 
possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with 
only one totality.  Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity 
                                                
137 Of course, there is another sense of the term ‘contingency’ that means something like dependence, but that is not 
what we are talking about here. 
138 Lenn E. Goodman, Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age, Chapter 6: 
“Determinism and freedom in Spinoza, Maimonides, and Aristotle”, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, 1999, p. 169. 
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is impossible.  The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into 
an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow 
of turning.139 
James does not mention Spinoza by name in connection with the block-universe charge.  
However, James would surely identify Spinoza as a determinist, and it is to determinism 
generally that James intends the charge to apply.  We have now to consider the justice of this 
allegation with respect to Spinoza. 
 In relation to this issue, Goodman considers the question of whether Spinoza accepts 
alternative futures.140  Goodman first acknowledges that talk of alternative futures is “certainly 
not the sort of language he [Spinoza] approves”.  Still, like Aristotle, Goodman recommends that 
a distinction be drawn in this context between “futures whose determinants are given” and 
“futures whose determinants have not yet emerged”.  Goodman asserts that this distinction is 
consistent with Spinoza’s account of the “dynamic and reflexive character of conatus”.  
Moreover, this account “allows a Bergsonian rather than Laplacean account of determination”.  
According to Goodman, this means: 
…things on Spinoza’s account must act in accordance with what they are; but 
they have not always been what they are, and they do contribute, through their 
own actions, to the making of what they are. 
Thus, according to Goodman, Bergson’s notion of an open future is more consonant with 
Spinoza’s philosophy than is the “linear and static” determinism of Laplace, which does not 
                                                
139 William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism”, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 
Dover, p. 150.  The term ‘block-universe’ itself appears in a footnote on p. 181 of the same essay, and ‘solid block’ 
appears on p. 158. 
140 Lenn E. Goodman, Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age, Chapter 6: 
“Determinism and freedom in Spinoza, Maimonides, and Aristotle”, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, 1999, pp. 168-169.  The subsequent references to and quotations of Goodman in this and the next two 
paragraphs are all from this same site. 
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allow “feedback, reflexivity or recursion”.  Goodman illustrates this claim with a reference to 
Maimonides’ response to the problem of human freedom and divine omniscience.  According to 
Maimonides, God’s foreknowledge that a particular possibility will be realized does not militate 
against the contingent character of this possibility, and therefore does not interfere with human 
freedom of will.  Goodman concludes: 
Spinoza’s commitment to universal causality, I would argue, is no more 
compromised by an open future than is the biblical commitment to God’s 
universal agency….  What we must remember in Spinoza’s case is that the 
dynamism of the conatus, to act at all, must make a difference—not between what 
is and what must be but between what is and what otherwise (that is, in 
abstraction from its agency) might have been. 
 Evidently, Goodman would reject James’s block-universe charge with reference to 
Spinoza.  But how far is Goodman’s reading here sustainable as an interpretation, rather than 
emendation, of Spinoza?  It is certainly true that “things on Spinoza’s account…do contribute, 
through their own actions, to the making of what they are”, and that this is allowed by the 
“dynamic and reflexive character of conatus”.  (We briefly considered the implications of this 
point vis-à-vis human freedom in the fourth paragraph of this section.)  Is this point sufficient for 
genuine contingency and an open future?141  The answer to this question depends upon whether, 
or in what sense, Spinoza is entitled to the distinction between “futures whose determinants are 
given” and “futures whose determinants have not yet emerged”.  In this connection, Spinoza 
says: 
                                                
141 We say genuine contingency, as opposed to the qualified sort of contingency that Spinoza does allow, in which a 
thing is called contingent just because we are ignorant of its actual modal status (which can only be necessary or 
impossible). 
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Every individual thing, i.e., anything whatever which is finite and has a 
determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined 
to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate 
existence, and this cause again cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be 
determined to exist and to act by another cause, which is also finite and has a 
determinate existence, and so ad infinitum.142 
The point that is expressed here by Spinoza in terms of causes can also be expressed in terms of 
determinants, for, in Spinoza, these amount to essentially the same thing.  Accordingly, insofar 
as by the term ‘determinants’, as used in the distinction above, one means “proximate 
determinants”, Spinoza could consistently speak of futures whose determinants have not yet 
emerged.  Even so, according to Spinoza, these (proximate) determinants that have not yet 
emerged will likewise have their (proximate) determinants, and so on, clear back to those 
(proximate) determinants that are present now (and that are, in this sense, “given”) and, indeed, 
on back without end into the past.  Furthermore, nowhere along this continuum of determination 
can there be any deviation from the one fixed path.143  Therefore, unless one means the term 
‘determinants’ in the restricted sense of “proximate determinants”, there are, for Spinoza, no 
futures whose determinants have not yet emerged, for—given the necessary connections that 
exist among determinants—the more remote determinants, just as much as the proximate 
determinants, are sufficient to render necessary the one and only future that is possible.  
Therefore, the distinction between futures whose determinants are given and futures whose 
                                                
142 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Proposition 28, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett edition, p. 233. 
143 Our use of the term ‘path’ here may suggest a simple linear sequence.  Of course, to suppose that determination is 
a simple linear process would be a gross oversimplification.  Spinoza, as we have already noted a couple of times 
now, does speak of a “chain of causes”, but his use of this expression is not intended to suggest a simple linear 
sequence either.  However, that determination is complex and not adequately expressed by terms such as ‘path’ and 
‘chain’ does not alter the nature of the case with respect to the issue at hand. 
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determinants have not yet emerged that Goodman invokes, on behalf of Spinoza, in support of 
contingency and an open future—although sustainable in the sense that we just indicated, and 
although more broadly sustainable if indeterminism is granted—is simply not available in the 
sense required to support contingency and an open future, so long as one abides the deterministic 
principles of Spinoza’s philosophical system. 
 The significance of the foregoing conclusions in connection with the issue of the freedom 
of the individual is this.  Spinoza can consistently maintain, and indeed does maintain, that the 
individual itself plays a role in its own making.  This is no small thing, and supports, as we noted 
earlier, a sort of freedom for the individual that many other determinists cannot claim.  Even so, 
all the actions that the individual undertakes that contribute to its own making (which, in truth, 
include all of its actions)—just as much as all the extrinsic factors that impinge upon the 
individual, and also contribute to its making—are necessitated by determinants that exist before 
this supposed individual itself even comes on the scene, and, a fortiori, before it makes any 
choices or undertakes any actions at all.  Therefore, observe or posit all the “feedback, reflexivity 
or recursion” that you please, the complexity of the course of determination is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the individual—in a real and not merely hypothetical sense—can do 
otherwise than it actually does, and irrelevant also to the question of whether the individual per 
se is ultimately responsible for its actions and character.  Therefore, the freedom that is properly 
ascribed to the individual under Spinoza’s system is a decidedly qualified freedom; it is certainly 
not genuine freedom of will. 
 Does this mean that James is correct in charging Spinoza, along with all strict 
determinists, with endorsing a block-universe account of reality?  Insofar as this rather 
opprobrious-sounding ascription is intended simply as a synonym for strict determinism, then of 
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course Spinoza, as a strict determinist, does endorse a block-universe account of reality.  
However, the expression may call to mind a universe with no movement or change at all—just 
fixed immutable being.  Parmenides may have held this view of the cosmos, but Spinoza, 
certainly, does not.  Indeed, Spinoza devotes most of his efforts to issues of becoming, as 
evidenced by his notion of the developmental character of individual essence (conatus), and by 
his special concern with self-development and improvement.  Nor is any of this inconsistent with 
his strict determinism, for strict determinism does not entail the absence of change and 
development.  Therefore, to the extent that the expression ‘block-universe’ is understood to 
imply universal stasis, Spinoza certainly does not endorse a block-universe account of reality. 
 A related point upon which I am not entirely clear, and upon which I have heard 
conflicting interpretations, is whether Spinoza understands what he calls “the whole of Nature” 
as itself dynamic and changing.  That is, does Spinoza understand the whole of Nature, as such, 
as an immutable totality, beyond change because itself inclusive of all change, and transcending 
duration because itself inclusive of all duration, or rather, does Spinoza understand the whole of 
Nature in the same fashion that he understands individual essence (conatus), that is, as constant 
in its essence but involved in duration and subject to change?  More succinctly put, does Spinoza 
understand the whole of Nature as transtemporal, or as intratemporal?  (Of course, Spinoza 
understands time as such to be a purely abstract notion, “a product of the imagination”.144  Very 
well—let the contrast then be between transdurational and intradurational.)  In this connection, 
Spinoza says: 
We thus see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways and yet 
preserve its nature….  [Such composite individuals can go on to compose further 
individual things, and so on.]  If we thus continue to infinity, we shall readily 
                                                
144 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 44, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett Edition, pp. 269-270. 
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conceive the whole of Nature as one individual whose parts—that is, all the 
constituent bodies—vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as 
a whole.145 
Goodman evidently interprets Spinoza’s notion of the whole of Nature, or “the universe as a 
whole”, as intratemporal (or intradurational) in nature: 
Spinoza has refined Aristotle’s essentialism to allow temporal variation within 
nature at large without changing the essential face of nature, just as he has refined 
Parmenides’ monism to allow unity in nature without compromising the variety of 
existents.146 
In the vocabulary of the contemporary Western philosophy of time, this would make Spinoza a 
presentist as opposed to an eternalist.  Most philosophers in this tradition view Spinoza as an 
eternalist.  However, if Goodman is right regarding this point, then he is also correct to see some 
concurrence between Spinoza and Bergson, despite the latter’s unequivocal rejection of strict 
determinism.  As I say, I am not sure where Spinoza himself stands on this issue.  I do think it 
true, however, that taking Spinoza (or any strict determinist) as a presentist is the only way to 
“save the phenomenon” of motion and change within the context of his determinism, and 
accordingly, the only way for this (or any) strictly deterministic philosophy to avoid entailing a 
block universe in the stronger sense that we distinguish above.147 
                                                
145 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Proposition 13, Lemma 7, Scholium, translated by Samuel Shirley, Hackett Edition, pp. 
254-255. 
146 Lenn E. Goodman, Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age, Chapter 6: 
“Determinism and freedom in Spinoza, Maimonides, and Aristotle”, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey, 1999, p. 155. 
147 In this assessment, we ignore the question of whether presentism and determinism are consistent.  In the 
contemporary Western philosophy of time, some philosophers reject presentism because they believe that if a reach 
of the temporal dimension is determinate (as at least the past surely is), then the doctrine of presentism is not 
sustainable.  Such philosophers, if they are indeterminists, may then endorse what is sometimes called the “growing-
block” theory.  If a philosopher with this same worry is also a determinist, then they are pushed to some version of 
eternalism (of course, eternalism does not entail determinism).  Presentists could respond to this criticism by 
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 Nonetheless, because of the difficulties involved in presentism, this approach takes 
Spinoza’s philosophy in a precarious direction.  Among other difficulties, it is widely held, and 
to my view, correctly held, that presentism is inconsistent with Einstein’s special theory of 
relativity.148  Moreover, if presentism is endorsed, the only way to consistently speak of “one 
individual whose parts…vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole” 
is by recourse to the notion of essence as the real identity of the supposed individual in question 
(otherwise, clearly, the whole does change with a change in its parts).  However, for those who 
believe, as I do, that to take the notion of essence as referring to something concretely real is 
tantamount to hypostatizing a mere concept, this approach is unavailable.  This means that the 
only way to make good sense of the passage from Spinoza just quoted above is by understanding 
the individual (any individual, although we are here considering the whole of Nature) as a 
transtemporal entity.  In this way, the variation to which Spinoza refers is recognized as an 
internal matter that, sub specie aeternitatis, involves no change in the whole as such, but rather, 
is simply the variation along the temporal dimension of the eternal whole.  Naturally, to James’s 
view, chary as he is of anything that smacks of an absolute, this approach will seem just another 
avenue to a block-universe account of reality.  However, pace James, if this approach is coupled 
with the rejection of strict causal determinism (and here, of course, we part company with 
Spinoza), then, from any perspective to which there is a future at all, the future is open.  
Therefore, in this sense, this approach is not properly subject to the block-universe charge, and 
does allow genuine freedom of will. 
                                                                                                                                                       
claiming that, in speaking of a “reach of the temporal dimension”, their critics are simply begging the question, for 
according to presentism, there is no temporal dimension per se at all.  This approach, however, renders much of 
common sense and scientific theory untenable. 
148 Naturally, this inconsistency could be resolved by rejecting Einstein’s special theory of relativity, but there are 
very strong independent grounds for believing that the special theory of relativity is true. 
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 We have not yet directly answered the questions of whether the thesis of determinism is 
true, and whether freedom of will is compatible with indeterminism.  Although a few parting 
words on these issues seem appropriate here, we must be brief.  First, in connection with the 
question of whether the thesis of determinism is true, I have an indirect proof that it is not true.  
One of the particularly problematic issues in the philosophy of time is the directionality (often 
misleadingly called the asymmetry) of temporality.  None of the so-called laws of physics 
provides a basis for this directionality.149  Moreover, on the assumption of strict determinism, no 
explanation is possible.  However, if indeterminism is granted, then the basis for the 
directionality of temporality can be readily explained.150 
 Second, with reference to the question of whether freedom of will is compatible with 
indeterminism, the standard concern is that indeterminism, far from providing a basis for 
freedom, instead reduces so-called choice to mere chance.  James boldly grasps the thistle of 
chance, but many others feel that chance is antithetical to freedom, or, at any rate, is not 
compatible with the kind of freedom that anyone would want.  To respond to this challenge in 
detail would require more space than is appropriately spent here.  Let us provide just a hint, then.  
We have emphasized throughout this study that the term ‘freedom’ is ambiguous.  In one sense 
of the term (“freedom of will”), freedom is not compatible with determinism.  In another sense of 
the term (“freedom to act in accordance with will”), some believe, as we have seen, that freedom 
is only compatible with determinism.  If this latter is true, then obviously these two sorts of 
freedom are not mutually compatible.  Even so, there is sometimes an expectation, or at least a 
desire, that we should be free in both of these senses, and this fosters what appears to be an 
                                                
149 It is sometimes claimed that the second law of thermodynamics provides a basis for the directionality of 
temporality, but this is not so.  The explanation of this point is a bit lengthy, however, and would be out of place 
here. 
150 Kenneth Faber, “The Basis for the Directionality of Time”, Chronos, Volume IX, 2008. 
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insoluble mystery.151  I think it a mistake, however, to believe that freedom to act in accordance 
with will, or any other important kind of freedom, is only compatible with determinism.  It is 
surely a false dichotomy to suppose that if we are not fully determinative of our own choices, or 
if our choices do not arise necessarily out of our own nature, then we are not determinative of 
our choices at all.  Therefore, even though there is a sense in which indeterminism does mean 
chance—or, more eulogistically, spontaneity—this does not mean that our choices do not arise 
out of our own nature.  It only means that multiple choices are consistent with our nature.152 
 
                                                
151 This result is nicely portrayed, albeit perhaps unintentionally, in Peter van Inwagen, “The Mystery of 
Metaphysical Freedom”, reprinted in Arguing About Metaphysics, edited by Michael C. Rea, Routledge, New York, 
2009, pp. 420-427.  With respect to the issue at hand, there is sometimes also a subtle equivocation on the term 
‘freedom’, and this exacerbates the confusion. 
152 This is, so far, a rather superficial account, couched in our ordinary way of speaking about such matters.  A 
deeper account requires a criticism of our ordinary understanding of the nature of the individual (along the lines of 
the Buddhist notion of anatman), along with a criticism of our ordinary understanding of the nature of volition.  
Spinoza provides some useful insights in connection with this latter issue. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
PRAGMATICS 
 
 
 
A Prolegomenon to Pragmatics 
 
 
 
 As a first approximation, let us define pragmatics as philosophical theory that is directly 
concerned with practice.  It is not enough, of course, to stop short with pragmatics; we seek not 
merely the union of theory and practice in theory, but also the union of theory and practice in 
practice.153  It is for this very reason, however, that pragmatics is a crucial part of philosophical 
theory.  Pragmatics is the mediating link between theory, on the one hand, and the application of 
theory, on the other.  The value and import of this linkage is not restricted to the side of 
application.  A metaphysical theory finds its whole meaning and significance only in conjunction 
with an articulated pragmatics, a pragmatics that is both based upon, and more fully expresses, 
the metaphysical theory. 
 Pragmatics subsumes several familiar and well-established spheres of concern, including 
ethics, politics (political philosophy), and soteriology (broadly conceived).  Collectively, these 
spheres of concern encompass a wide array of inquiries and endeavors.  A broad view is, of 
course, liable to be superficial.  However, such a view, even if superficial, is not without its 
value.  A map of the continent, although it tells us nothing of our immediate neighborhood, is 
nonetheless of service for certain ends.  Our immediate neighborhood finds its place within the 
                                                
153 I owe this turn of phase to Prof. John Lachs. 
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map of the continent.  Furthermore, ethics, politics, and soteriology are not altogether distinct 
studies and practices—they grade into one another in significant ways. 
 In this introductory and propaedeutical work on pragmatics, we consider some 
foundational issues in ethics, politics, and soteriology, and offer some concluding remarks 
regarding the integration of these respective fields. 
 
 
Ethics 
 
 
 
 There is a way of conceiving ethics in which ethics is understood to be concerned with 
actively promoting good and thwarting bad.  There is another way of conceiving ethics in which 
ethics is understood to be concerned with identifying, creating, and following rules.  The latter 
approach we can call ethical legalism.  Ethical legalism is often largely negative in character, 
proscribing acts that we must not do (“thou shalt not…”), although it can also be positive in the 
sense of demanding acts that we must do.154  Meanwhile, the other approach, for which it is not 
easy to find a suitable identifying term, we can call ethical directism, for this approach is not 
based upon rules and the imposition of strictures, but upon immediately seeking the good.155  
Kantian deontology is a good exemplar of ethical legalism, while Buddhist ethics is a good 
exemplar of ethical directism. 
 It would be overly simplistic to suppose that these two approaches to ethics are altogether 
incompatible, for mixed systems are possible.  Moreover, each side has innumerable variations.  
                                                
154 To some extent, this distinction between positive and negative rules is a function of expression.  For instance, the 
negative proscription do not lie can also be expressed, although not quite equivalently, as the positive 
pronouncement tell the truth. 
155 In certain systems based upon ethical directism, there may be rules in the sense of precepts or generally 
recommended principles, but these are not supposed to be fundamental, nor are they understood to be absolutely 
binding.  They are intended primarily for those who have not yet developed the sophistication and sensitivity to act 
for the best without their aid. 
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Nonetheless, there are these two contrasting tendencies in ethical thought.  Ethical legalism, for 
its part, is concerned primarily with the limits of behavior.  Certain acts are prohibited, and 
perhaps also certain acts are required, but within these bounds, there is no further exhortation.  
Egoism, an approach to life based principally upon self-interest, may even be encouraged, or at 
least not actively discouraged, so long as the established boundaries are not transgressed.  
Meanwhile, ethical directism is more pervasive in its application.  Although this approach 
promulgates no strict and invariant rules or laws, all acts and behavior, and indeed, all speech 
and thought, are properly subject to ethical evaluation.  Even so, there is with ethical directism a 
greater openness and freedom, for there are no ultimate commandments or demands.  One simply 
does what one sees to be best for all concerned. 
 Modern Western moral philosophy has been dominated by a legalistic approach to ethics, 
concerning itself with such notions as rights and obligations.  Not surprisingly, many attempts to 
extend the scope of ethics beyond the human domain have themselves been based upon this kind 
of legalism.  This way of thinking generally assumes that rights are an all-or-nothing sort of 
affair, and that some beings have rights and some do not.  These assumptions generate the issue 
of “where to draw the line” with regard to proper moral concern.156 
 The legalistic approach to ethics faces the difficulty of explaining the basis for the 
supposed rights and obligations.  Unless one falls back upon some sort of divine-command 
theory, one is left with “laws without a lawgiver”.157  Further, the all-or-nothing assumption of 
the legalistic approach does not conform to the more continuous gradations of sentience, and 
                                                
156 The issue of “where to draw the line” appears both inter-specifically, in debates concerning the propriety of 
including other animals within the scope of moral concern, and intra-specifically, in debates concerning the proper 
moral status of human beings at different stages of development (such as occur in connection with the issues of 
abortion and euthanasia). 
157 Cf. G. E. M. Abscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”.  Cf. also the founding documents of the government of the 
United States (e.g., “endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights”).  Although we reject the divine 
command theory, this does not mean that rights can have no basis, for they can be grounded in human law. 
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other morally relevant features, that we find in nature.  For these reasons, we maintain that 
although a legalistic approach has its place in human legal systems, it fails as a foundational 
moral theory and as an ultimate ground of ethics. 
 In opposition to a legalistic approach to ethics, we recommend an ethics founded upon 
deliberately cultivated altruism.  Such altruism is generated through compassion and the 
recognition of the ultimate non-difference of the supposed self and other.  In developing this 
ethics, we draw upon resources found in Mahayana Buddhism, Vedanta, Schopenhauer, 
Sidgwick, Hume, Spinoza, and other sources.  This ethics provides a sound basis not only for 
including non-human animals within the scope of proper moral concern, but also for giving due 
consideration to other commonly recognized levels of organization such as communities and 
ecosystems. 
 In the absence of available recourse to the divine-command theory of ethics (either 
because God does not exist, or because God is not the sort of being that makes laws of the kind 
at issue), the question arises concerning the status and basis of the supposed moral laws.  How 
can there be such laws without a lawgiver?  In response to this question, there arises, in the 
history of Western philosophy, an effort to establish these supposed laws on rational grounds.  
This is the project of Kantian deontology most obviously, but is also an objective of the other 
dominant modern moral theories, insofar as they take a legalistic approach.  Although we 
maintain that these theories fail to provide a defensible basis for ethical legalism, we shall not 
pause to defend this point here. 
 Even if one grants that one or more of these legalistic moral theories succeeds in 
establishing a rational basis for moral law, the question remains: Why obey the moral law?  It is 
not as though we are forced to obey the supposed moral laws in the same way that we are forced 
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to obey the supposed physical laws.  Although each of the major ethical theories has its own 
story to tell in response to this question, these responses are not generally convincing without the 
supposed sanction of divine authority.158 
 Some have concluded, as a consequence of this difficulty, that morality is subjective, 
relative, or not ultimately binding.159  If morality is held to be a function of external authority, 
and if the supposed external authority is not operative (as when one’s fellows or God are not 
looking, or are not believed to exist), one may suppose that the reasonable thing is to pursue 
one’s own private interests, whatever one takes these to be.  In addition to this attitude being 
taken up as a practical maxim, ethical egoism arises as a theory.160  All of this is the result of 
conceiving morality as a matter of external, alien authority, of being forced to do what is not 
really in one’s own interests to do.  When this is the operative assumption, one may conclude 
that the interests of others may and should be disregarded when it is practically expedient to do 
so.  Some have concluded this, with disastrous consequences.161 
 An early alternative to the legalistic approach to ethics is articulated in Plato’s Republic.  
There, Plato develops the idea that justice is in the interest of the individual itself.  Just as justice 
                                                
158 Cf. Louis P. Pojman, “Religion Gives Meaning to Life”.  The notion of natural law has been advanced as a 
substitute for divine law.  However, usually, as in Aquinas (and as in Locke with regard to natural rights), God is 
still appealed to as the guarantor of natural law.  Without such a guarantor, there are a number of questions that are 
difficult if not impossible for the natural-law theorist to answer.  These questions include:  (1) What is the basis for 
such natural law?  (2) What is its ontological status?  For instance, where, and in what, does natural law exist?  (3) 
How do we know what the natural law is?  (4) What are the contents of natural law?  (5) How is natural law 
enforced?  (6) What are the consequences of violating natural law?  In the absence of adequate answers to these and 
related questions, natural law theory reveals itself to be a hollow attempt to retain the function of supposed divine 
law without the ground that divine command theory provides for this supposed law.  In such case, popular appeals to 
natural law are reduced, as Prof. Lachs has said, to vacuous rhetorical flourish. 
159 As we shall see, such ascriptions are appropriate only when morality is understood in legalistic terms. 
160 Cf. Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness. 
161 The case of Jeffrey Dahmer, a late twentieth-century serial killer in the United States, illustrates this point well.  
In a television interview, Dahmer reported that although he had long had murderous impulses, he had for a time 
restrained himself from acting upon these impulses because he believed that murder was forbidden by God, and that 
God would punish him if he acted upon these impulses.  However, when he came to believe that God did not exist, 
he concluded that there was no reason to refrain from acting upon his urges, for without God, there was no authority 
or basis for any prohibitions except human authority, and he figured that he could dodge that. 
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at the level of the state consists in a harmonious relationship amongst the individuals composing 
the state, with each individual doing its proper part and working for the common good of all, so 
does justice at the level of the individual consist in a harmonious relationship amongst the parts 
of the soul, with each part doing its proper part in working for the common good of the 
individual.  Therefore, justice is in one’s own deeper self-interest.162  Even if we had Gyges’ 
ring—that is, even if we were free of the constraints of external authority—the reason for acting 
justly, the reason for ethical behavior, would still exist. 
 Plato is on the right track in this connection.  However, Plato understands the individual 
in a rather conventional way, and ethical action is not always in the interest of the individual 
conceived in this way; behaving ethically does sometimes require that we sacrifice our own 
private good as conventionally understood.  Thus, Plato’s approach is not sufficient to serve as 
the basis for a full-fledged ethical theory.  What we need is an ethics that goes beyond Plato, 
without appealing to external authority, or otherwise taking a legalistic approach.  To be truly 
ethical is to sometimes do what is not in one’s immediate ordinary self-interest.  However, so 
long as one behaves ethically for a worldly reward—or for an otherworldly reward—one has not 
really gone beyond mere self-interest (with the self still conceived in a ordinary sense). 
 We are often willing to forsake present good for future good, even though we do not 
experience the future good now.  Why is this so?  One answer that can be given to this question 
is that it is because we identify with the supposed future individual that is expected to be the 
recipient of the good.  Why do we identify with that supposed individual?  Common sense—and 
much of philosophy—responds that it is because the supposed future individual will still be the 
same individual as the individual making the choice.  Meanwhile, the biological explanation for 
this behavior is that it is because the supposed future individual will carry the same genetic 
                                                
162 Of course, I am leaving out some of the steps of the argument. 
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type,163 and therefore this behavior has evolved through natural selection.164  Moreover, the 
favoring of one’s own progeny and other close kin can be explained on a similar basis.  
Nonetheless, this is all still ordinary “selfishness” at the level of the gene.165 
 Some would leave it at this.  Can we go further?  So far, we have only offered some 
explanations of why individuals are willing to forsake present good for future good.  There 
remains the question of whether this tendency is ethically justified.  This question is raised by 
Sidgwick in the context of a discussion of utilitarianism and its justification: 
If the Utilitarian has to answer the question ‘Why should I sacrifice my own 
happiness for the greater happiness of another?’ it must surely be admissible to 
ask the Egoist, ‘Why should I sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the 
future?  Why should I concern myself about my own future feelings any more 
than about the feelings of other persons?’166 
Again, Sidgwick asks: 
Grant that the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the permanent 
identical ‘I’ is not a fact but a fiction, as Hume and his followers maintain; why, 
then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the Ego is resolved be 
concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other 
series?167 
                                                
163 Not the same genetic token, but it will have roughly the same meaning or interpretation, for it will consist of the 
same sequence of nucleotide bases. 
164 Again, I leave out some steps here. 
165 Cf. Richard Dawkins, E. O. Wilson and others.  So-called “reciprocal altruism”, which is really just apparent 
altruism, can also be explained in evolutionary terms. 
166 Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 418.  [In Ayer and O’Grady, p. 422.] 
167 Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 419.  [In Ayer and O’Grady, p. 424.] 
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The question included in this latter passage is essentially the same as the final question included 
in the foregoing passage, and calls for a justification (why should I?) rather than an explanation 
(why do I?). 
 How shall we answer?  Why should one be more concerned for the good of a future self 
in one’s own lineage than for the good of any other self, present or future?  The answer is that, 
generally speaking, one should not—there is no general ethical justification for this tendency.  
One part of a series should not be more concerned with another part of the same series than it is 
with the parts of any other series, for all experiences are experiences of the one concrete reality.  
The recognition of this truth is the proper foundation of ethics. 
 Even so, there are often reasons why seemingly favoring “our own” series is justified.  
For instance, we often have a more precise sense of what is in the specific interests of later parts 
of our own series than we do with respect to the parts other series.  Moreover, certain kinds of 
projects are best furthered by paying special heed to our own series.  However, these and other 
such considerations do not mean that our actual concern should be greater; although we must act 
locally, we should think globally. 
 On what basis do we hold this view regarding the proper foundation of ethics?  As 
background, let us recall Schopenhauer’s notion of eternal justice, the notion that, at root, the 
tormentor and the tormented are the one (“nature sinks its fangs into its own flesh”).  Let us 
recall also the Upanishadic notion of Tat tvam asi (That thou art), and the Mahayana Buddhist 
notion of bodhichitta (enlightened mind).  In light of these understandings of reality, there is a 
sense in which ethics, understood as altruism, “falls to the ground”.  That is, it turns out that what 
appears to be altruism from the perspective of an ordinary understanding of personal identity is 
actually self-interest from the perspective of a deeper understanding of personal identity.  In this 
 109 
way, we are able to answer the question: “Why be moral?”168  We should be moral because it is 
in our own more expansive interest to be.  In a sense, then, altruism drops out of the account.  
Even so, altruism, now properly understood, is restored, for the individual, as commonly 
conceived, should not always act in its own limited interest.  Thus, although our theory does not 
depend upon ultimate altruism, it nonetheless advocates altruism from the perspective of the 
ordinary understanding of the individual self.169  In this way, we go beyond the limits of Plato’s 
theory while retaining something of its spirit, namely, the affirmation that it is indeed in our own 
interests to behave ethically when we understand what our true nature and interests are. 
 Although we ordinarily identify most strongly with our conventional sense of self, we can 
learn to recognize our deeper alliance with others.  This is one of the proximate aims of the 
cultivation of compassion in Mahayana Buddhism.  Such compassion is not to be confused with 
pity, understood in the sense that Nietzsche finds objectionable and criticizes.  To have 
compassion (in the Mahayana Buddhist sense) for another is not to hold oneself to be superior to 
the other, much less is it to hold the other in contempt.  It is, rather, to recognize that the problem 
of “the other” is not other than one’s own problem.  That is, while relative bodhichitta does still 
suppose that the other is not oneself, absolute bodhichitta recognizes that the supposed other is 
ultimately non-different from oneself.  This recognition, tantamount to enlightenment, is 
simultaneously the culmination of ethics, and the achievement of the final soteriological goal. 
 Objection: “You say that ‘all experiences are experiences of the one concrete reality’.  
But if I hit my neighbor’s arm, she feels it, not me.  So this business of us all sharing a common 
identity proves to be an idle suggestion after all.” 
                                                
168 This is a traditional expression of a question that is better expressed, in the context of our theory, as: “Why 
should we be concerned for, and make sacrifices for, the welfare of others in addition to ourselves?” 
169 Cf. Nagarjuna’s notion of the “two truths”. 
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 Reply: What you say points to an important truth.  In assessing the claim that we all share 
a common identity, we must understand correctly what this means.  Understood correctly, this 
claim does not deny any facts of the kind that you just illustrated.  In fact, it acknowledges them, 
and, at the same time, deepens our understanding of them.  Take the example of you hitting your 
neighbor’s arm.  You say that it is not you that feels it.  If by ‘you’, you mean your immediate 
subjective awareness, this is true.  But it is also true that neither the pain that you suffered 
yesterday nor the pain that you will suffer tomorrow is part of your immediate subjective 
awareness.  “Yes,” you reply, “but the difference is that those earlier and later awarenesses were 
had, or will be had, by me, while her awareness was not, and never will be.”  Now, if it is not, 
solely, your immediate awareness with which you are identifying in the context of your remark, 
we can ask why it is that you identify with a certain portion of awareness outside of this 
immediacy, but not the rest.  In other words, what is this thing that you take to be you, and what 
is its basis and nature? 
 We do not hesitate to believe that it will be we who suffer the hangover consequent upon 
our excessive drinking tonight, or that it was we who suffered the hangover some ten years 
hence.  But clearly we do not now suffer these hangovers; it is not we as this present awareness 
that suffers.  But this (our present) awareness is identifying with these past and future suffering 
awarenesses.  And we do this in part because we are continuous with them: the awareness that 
suffered in the past has grown into my present awareness, and my present awareness will grow 
into my future awareness. 
 Now, these past and future awarenesses can be more or less remote, and we do tend to 
identify more strongly with those awarenesses that are more proximate (consider the remark that 
is sometimes made that a person is no longer the same person who they were at some earlier 
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date).  When one’s identification extends beyond one’s immediate awareness, however, it is 
generally due in part to this supposed continuity with the other awarenesses that come earlier or 
later in the sequence.  But in truth, there is a continuity among all awareness, for all awareness is 
awareness of the one concrete reality.  So, for precisely the same reason that we have for 
identifying with our earlier and later awarenesses, namely, continuity, we have reason to identify 
with the whole of awareness.  Of course, we can, and usually do, identify with a mere portion of 
this whole, but when we do this, we are identifying with an abstraction.  If we reify such 
conceptual abstractions, we delude ourselves concerning what is actually concretely real. 
 Objection: “Your ethical theory, which you have characterized as a form of ‘ethical 
directism’, is really nothing but ethical subjectivism (or ethical relativism).” 
 Reply: Not so.  The opposition between subjectivism and objectivism in ethics, as usually 
conceived, only arises in the context of moral legalism; when legalism is rejected, this opposition 
itself falls to the ground.  Even so, from the perspective of a traditional ethical objectivist, our 
theory will undoubtedly appear to be a rejection of ethical objectivism, traditionally understood.  
That it is, for we do deny that there are any objective fundamental moral laws.  This is obvious, 
for we deny that there are any fundamental moral laws at all.  However, our theory is quite 
different from traditional subjectivism or ethical relativism, for we not only reject the legalism 
through which these views get their sense, but, more importantly, we affirm that certain attitudes, 
courses of action, ways of being in the world, etc., are objectively better than others.  In this way, 
our view is actually more like objectivism than subjectivism. 
 The lack of any ultimate commands, obligations, or duties in our approach to ethics will 
be disconcerting to many accustomed to the legalistic approach.  The worry is that our approach 
amounts to an “anything goes” philosophy, that if people are not constrained, they will simply do 
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as they will—as they are inclined to do by their baser impulses—and, as a consequence, much 
harm will result that is avoided with a legalistic approach. 
 A number of things can be said in response to this concern.  First, even if it were true that 
our ethics has these negative consequences, this would not be evidence that legalistic ethics has a 
rationally defensible basis.  Second, while it is true that some (and perhaps, in our time, even 
many) people will not behave well without the threat of external sanctions, nothing we are saying 
is intended to imply that all external sanctions should be eliminated.  Human law, social 
pressure, and other means of modifying recalcitrant human behavior still have their place, and 
probably will for some time to come.  Our denial of legalism is primarily a denial of a certain 
kind of theoretical view concerning the fundamental ground of ethics.  Even so, third, it is often 
true that people are made better not by commands to do what they are themselves opposed to 
doing, but rather by instruction and guidance in what is really in their own deeper self-interest.  
This means that it is a consequence of our theory that a shift of resources from “criminal justice” 
(the reactive, punitive, and often vindictive approach) to education (the proactive, cultivating, 
and forgiving approach) is recommended.  The goal is a harmony between what individuals 
desire to do and what is best for all concerned.  Therefore, instead of understanding inclination 
as the antithesis of ethical behavior, as does Kant, inclination is used as an instrument of ethical 
behavior.  This is achieved by cultivating the inclination and deliberately fostering good habits, 
and by developing a deeper understanding of the nature of our situation. 
 We have spoken here mostly with respect to foundational issues in ethics, and this may 
have given a mistaken impression.  Therefore, let us reiterate that nothing that we have said 
should be taken to imply that we deny or depreciate the value of establishing rules and 
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cultivating good habits.170  On the contrary, we encourage these things, and they find their basis 
in the very ground that we have suggested.171  For some among us, and maybe most of us, these 
things remain useful.  Therefore, nothing of value is lost in terms of regulating behavior by 
abandoning ethical legalism, and one need not fear that chaos will reign.  Indeed, as we 
illustrated with the Jeffrey Dahmer case, it is ethical legalism that is on shaky theoretical ground.  
By encouraging the belief that the reason to behave ethically is that there is an enforceable 
command to do so, ethical legalism prepares the way for the abandonment of ethics altogether.  
To the one who loses faith in a divine enforcer, and who finds no compulsion in the abstract 
arguments of the moral philosophers, and who contrives to avoid human authority, supposed 
moral rules or laws can come to seem whole arbitrary and without motive power.  For such a 
person, ethics is reduced, if it survives at all, to the prudent management of self-interest. 
 A consequence of our fundamental ethical theory is that many of the debates among the 
standard ethical theories are superseded.  One need not decide whether utilitarianism or 
deontology provides a better foundation for ethics, for instance, for neither of these theories 
provides the foundation for ethics.  This opens the way for a pluralist approach to the standard 
theories.  It also lessens our surprise and our worry that these theories each have anomalies, 
disturbing counter-examples, and other defects.  Despite these shortcomings, each of the major 
ethical theories contains valuable insights and provides useful guidance.  When it is recognized 
that none of these theories provides a foundation for ethics, the rivalry between them is 
diminished, and the virtues of each can find their place within a new integrated system. 
 There is a further advantage to ethical directism.  For the most part, people do not like 
being subject to demands.  The motive force and emotional connection of ethical directism is not 
                                                
170 Including formal legal systems enforced with sanctions, although these sanctions should not be punitive in a 
retributive sense. 
171 A detailed account of this grounding belongs in another place. 
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fear, as it is with ethical legalism, but loving-kindness and compassion.  This is not only the more 
pleasant emotional connection, but also ultimately the more powerful.  While fear at best only 
motivates compliance with enforced requirements, loving-kindness and compassion motivate 
pervasively.  Moreover, by cultivating the immediate will to do whatever is actually best, ethical 
action becomes a matter of joyful effort rather than begrudging acquiescence.172 
 
 
Politics 
 
 
 
 Whether politics is understood as an extension of ethics or as an aspect of ethics is a 
conceptual matter, a matter of how expansively we use the respective terms.  I think it most 
convenient to consider politics as an extension of ethics, and then indicate their close connection 
by subsuming both under the rubric of pragmatics.   In this way, issues that apply to both can be 
discussed under one head, and for any specific differences, there remain the separate names.  In 
any event, politics is intimately associated with ethics, and, like ethics, finds its basis or ground 
in metaphysics. 
 When we say that reality is one continuous whole, we point to an important truth.  This 
statement, however, can be easily misunderstood.  On the one hand, in hearing it said that reality 
is a whole, someone might infer that reality is composed of parts.  Based upon this view, it might 
be supposed that the parts are in some measure autonomous, or, at any rate, are at least logically 
prior to the whole.  This is not true, and to believe this is to fall to one defective extreme, the 
extreme of atomism.  One the other hand, in hearing it said that reality is one, someone might 
                                                
172 For Kant, the apparent coincidence of inclination and duty is to be regarded with suspicion, for in such cases, one 
cannot be sure whether one is acting from duty or merely from inclination.  Therefore, one cannot be sure that one is 
dong one’s duty at all, for one may simply be beguiled by inclination.  In contrast, we put inclination in the service 
of ethical action, and see the highest ethical end to be the harmonization of what one is most inclination to do and 
what is actually best to do for all concerned. 
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infer that reality is a simple unity or singularity.  Based upon this view, it might be supposed that 
no opposition or conflict—indeed, no action of any kind—is possible (for these things depend 
upon differentiation and plurality).  This is not true, and to believe this is to fall to another 
defective extreme, the extreme of simple monism.  The truth lies not so much between these two 
extremes as beyond them.173 
 The term ‘organic unity’ is sometimes used to characterize a system in which neither the 
whole nor the supposed parts are prior to the other, but each is dependent upon the other.  To say 
that reality itself is an organic unity again points to an important truth, but this, too, can be 
misunderstood.  It is true that reality is not a simple unity—reality is spatiotemporally spread, 
and is spread in a non-uniform fashion.  Even so, there are, in truth, no parts per se at all; the so-
called parts are really only conceptual divisions of the continuum.174 
 In Section I, we said that all experiences are experiences of the one concrete reality (and 
are in this sense equal), and indicated that the recognition of this truth is the proper foundation of 
ethics.  To say that all experiences are experiences of the one concrete reality implies that reality 
is one continuous whole.  As we just indicated, however, properly understood this does not mean 
that no opposition or conflict is possible.  A snake is a sort of continuous whole, but this does not 
prevent it from biting its own tail. 
 A role and task of politics is to adjudicate opposition and conflict, with the aim of 
achieving the best possible result.  Opposition is not inherently bad; indeed, the dynamic 
character of reality is dependent upon it.  Nonetheless, certain kinds of opposition and conflict 
are productive of suffering and unhappiness, which, in themselves, are bad things.  Meanwhile, 
certain kinds of concord and cooperation are productive of joy and happiness, which, in 
                                                
173 It remains true that the two sides, although contradictory, do each point to an important part of the truth.  
Therefore, the full truth is in a sense both, in a sense neither.  Cf. Nagarjuna’s tetralemma. 
174 For this reason, we generally speak of “portions” rather than “parts” of reality. 
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themselves, are good things.  We need not suppose that these categories exhaust the sphere of 
good and bad things, nor need we suppose that they are the only fundamentally good and bad 
things;175 in any event, they themselves are good and bad things, and are thus worthy of being 
fostered and thwarted, respectively.  Meanwhile, various projects also are advanced through 
concord and cooperation, and hampered by opposition and conflict, and perhaps some of these 
projects have value that is not reducible to, or fully explainable in terms of, the joy and happiness 
that they produce.  Finally, it should be acknowledged that sometimes opposition and conflict are 
productive of good.  In its aim to achieve the best possible result, politics must take all of these 
considerations into account. 
 A question for pragmatics generally, the answer to which being applicable to politics, is 
that of what kind of things have a good of their own.  We are generally inclined to think most 
especially of human individuals as having a good of their own.  Perhaps other sorts of animals 
also have a good of their own.  There are, however, other levels of organization, both more and 
less inclusive, such as organs, cells, and organelles, on the one hand, and families, towns, and 
nations, on the other.  Do any of these have a good of their own?  Does the whole of reality have 
a good of its own?  Moreover, what kind, or kinds, of “good of one’s own” are ethically and 
politically significant?  An automobile, for instance, has a good of its own, in that it can be in 
good repair or bad, and in that certain things are helpful to it and other things are harmful, 
relative to its intended function.  Even so, we do not ordinarily suppose that an automobile has 
preferences or experiences in the way that we suppose that human beings do.  The answers to 
these sorts of questions are relevant to politics, for politics must know what goods it is seeking, 
and to whom or what these goods fall. 
                                                
175 Indeed, we need not suppose that there are any fundamentally good and bad things at all. 
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 If a human life is fortunately situated and well ordered, it will be productive of good 
experiences.  Similarly, if a community is fortunately situated and well ordered, it will be 
productive of good experiences.  Neither the human individual nor the community substantially 
exists as such; in this sense, neither has a good of its own, for both are merely conceptual 
categories.176  However, both the human individual and the community are conceptual categories 
that subsume good and bad experiences.  Therefore, these conceptual categories subsume 
something that does have a good of its own.177  In saying so, we are not supposing an atomism of 
individual experiences, with these individual experiences being the true and final recipients or 
repositories of the good.  It is a matter, instead, of there being a continuum of experience that can 
be overlaid with various categories of different extent.  Therefore, it makes sense to speak of the 
welfare of the community as such, for example, just as much—and in precisely the same way—
as it makes sense to speak of the welfare of the ordinary human individual as such. 
 The foregoing entails that the ordinary human individual is not properly conceived to be a 
uniquely privileged category.  This is highly significant.  It is sometimes said that the individual 
(or the family, or some other such category) is the fundamental unit of society.  According to our 
analysis, there is no fundamental unit of society (indeed, there is no fundamental unit at all, 
unless it be the whole of reality itself).  Obviously, this has profound implications for politics, for 
it means that politics should not be concerned only with maximizing the good of individuals as 
such; politics properly concerns itself with the good of all of the various levels of organization, 
and not merely as a means to the good of individuals.  This should rightly raise some concerns.  
                                                
176 Cf. the Buddhist notion of shunyata (“emptiness”), which we have discussed elsewhere.  Often, the ordinary 
human individual is considered to be an example par excellence of a particular; what we are saying here is that the 
ordinary human individual is better understood as a kind of universal. 
177 This is properly said of any conceptual category in which experience is included. 
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There has been no shortage of philosophies that have denied the significance individuals,178 and 
the application, or at least the ostensible application, of some of these philosophies has had some 
undeniably pernicious consequences.  Let us make clear, then, that it is by no means our intent to 
denigrate individuals, nor is it our intent to suggest that the category of ordinary individuality 
does not have special significance.  Even so, our philosophy does militate against radical forms 
of individualism, which we take to be in its favor, and it is exposed to some of the same concerns 
regarding individual autonomy that fall to utilitarianism.179 
 
 
Soteriology 
 
 
 
 We intimated something of the character of the soteriological goal toward the end of 
Section I, and indicated its involvement with ethics.  As we averred at the outset of this essay, 
the various aspects of pragmatics are closely connected.  Here we shall discuss soteriology more 
directly and in a little more detail. 
 The first point to note is that although both the term ‘soteriology’ and the related term 
‘salvation’ are of Western origin (and thus, especially in their early usage, tend to be associated 
with Christian, or a least Abrahamic, doctrines), we intend these terms in a much more general 
sense.  The term ‘soteriology’ does not show up much in contemporary philosophical 
discussions, but it is a common term in theology and religious studies, where it is now most often 
                                                
178 We have in mind here Fichte, Hegel, and some of their followers, among others.  For a nice account of this 
matter, see John Lachs, “The Insignificance of Individuals”, reprinted in John Lachs, A Community of Individuals, 
Routledge, 2003. 
179 Traditional utilitarianism is associated with an atomistic view of the individual, making some of these difficulties 
more intractable and recalcitrant than they are on our approach.  Nevertheless, we must answer these concerns, 
although this is not the place to do so in detail.  Our response invokes the naturalness and primacy of the category of 
ordinary individuality.  Even though there are no substantial individuals, the assumption that there are is pervasive, 
and to this we should pay due heed.  Moreover, the notion of the individual person is central, or at least apparently 
central, to many kinds of projects.  Accordingly, the specific interests of the ordinary individual are properly 
accorded more weight than they would be, based upon abstract considerations alone. 
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used in a broad sense.  Related notions in the Asian traditions include moksha (“liberation”), 
bodhi (“enlightenment”), and nirvana.  However, in saying that we intend the terms “soteriology’ 
and ‘salvation’ in a general sense, we do not merely mean in a culturally inclusive sense.  For 
instance, we certainly do not intend the term ‘salvation’ to apply only with reference to some 
supposed afterlife or eschatology,180 although assuaging the fear of death, and understanding the 
sense in which there is no death or passage, are among the aims of soteriology.  Under the head 
of soteriology, we mean to include a wide array of issues connected with achieving a well-lived, 
effective, and rewarding life, as well as issues concerned with matters that are popularly called 
spiritual.  The topic of the meaning of life will also be treated under this head.  Perhaps 
soteriology is not the best term for this purpose, but I have not so far thought of a better one for 
this array of closely connected concerns.  I am open to suggestions. 
 I do not expect to achieve much more here than to announce my intention to take up the 
subject of soteriology in greater depth, developing its connections with metaphysics and the rest 
of pragmatics.  One of the characterizations of pragmatics that we provided at the outset of this 
essay is that pragmatics is philosophical theory that is directly concerned with practice.  One of 
the reasons why, in the history of Western philosophy, metaphysics came to be considered a very 
dry and abstract, and eventually a largely irrelevant or even meaningless study, is that the 
metaphysicians themselves often did not adequately emphasize the practical implications and 
applications of their metaphysical theories.181  In truth, metaphysics has profound practical 
import, and pragmatics, as the mediating link between theory and practice, has the role and task 
                                                
180 Popular Christianity tends to strongly, if not exclusively, associate salvation with its consequences for a supposed 
afterlife, and thus insists that salvation depends upon the survival of death.  Of course, some Christian theologians 
resist this tendency.  Meanwhile, early Buddhist writings often give the impression that full liberation is only 
achieved with bodily death.  In contrast, most Mahayana Buddhist sources insist that nirvana is not an otherworldly 
matter, but rather something that can be achieved here and now. 
181 There are, of course, a few notable exceptions. 
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not only of making this practical import known, but also of drawing out the practical 
implications of particular metaphysical theories.  The specific portion of this role and task that 
falls to soteriology deals with issues of the sort that we just mentioned. 
 Metaphysics is valuable in part because of the direct salutary consequences of 
metaphysical understanding.  The development of this understanding is thus one of the practical 
applications of metaphysics, and, in Indian philosophy, is one of the principal ways to 
salvation.182  Right understanding of the nature of reality brings us happiness and peace, while 
misunderstanding and ignorance of the nature of reality can bring us sorrow and disquietude.  
One of the most insidious misunderstandings involves the nature of individuality; it is the failure 
to recognize our own true nature and identity.  We are naturally inclined to identify with 
constructed images of ourselves.  But these images, as we have suggested here, and have 
discussed more at length elsewhere, are only concepts; they are not our concrete reality.  
However, we tend to reify these conceptual images of ourselves and mistakenly identify with 
them.  This error ushers in a number of other mistaken views, including legalism in the ethical 
sphere and vicious individualism in the political sphere.  In the soteriological sphere, this error is 
the source of such maladies as the fear of death183 and annihilation, the belief that life is 
ultimately meaningless, and the uneasy (perhaps even terrorizing) feeling of being oppressed by 
a vast, alien, and indifferent universe.  Since these maladies, and the other mistaken views, are 
all rooted in the same source, they stand or fall together. 
                                                
182 In the Hindu traditions, this path to salvation is called jnana yoga. 
183 There is a natural “fear of death” that helps us and other animals avoid hazardous situations (we place the 
appelation in shudder quotes, for most such animals probably lack a concept of death, and hence do not fear death 
per se).  We speak here of the fear of death in the sense that it can plague people even in situations of relative safety. 
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 Let us consider an example that illustrates our point concerning how right understanding 
of the nature of reality brings us happiness and peace.184  People are often disturbed when they 
contemplate what they take to be their insignificant role in the “grand scheme of things”.  In a 
discussion of German idealism and the sense in which individuals are not of ultimate 
significance, Lachs illustrates a point regarding the relation between the individual and the work 
of spirit or the state with the help of an analogy: 
Friends of Hegel can readily, and rightly, argue that the work of spirit is 
impossible without concrete empirical persons.  But that is like maintaining the 
essentiality of cells for the body.  Of course cells are necessary constituents of the 
organism.  Nevertheless, no particular cell is necessary, and hence any cell is 
dispensable.185 
So too, individuals, although necessary en masse to the work of spirit or the state, are 
individually each an “insignificantly small fragment”186 of the larger whole.  Individuals can 
come and go like the drunken members of Hegel’s Bacchanalian revel187 without seeming to 
make any significant difference to the whole.  There is a sense, surely, in which this is true.  
Insofar as we conceive the whole abstractly and as passing through time, we do not have to 
consider relatively small internal additions and subtractions as altering the “essential identity” of 
the whole. 
 The situation is quite different, however, with respect to the relation between the 
individual and the transtemporal totality (“the Totality”) as a concrete reality.  It is only if we are 
                                                
184 This example falls under the head of the role of knowledge and understanding in salvation.  Other factors are also 
conducive to salvation, and we do not want to leave the false impression that discursive knowledge is the only way. 
185 John Lachs, ibid., p. 141.  In the same article, Lachs discusses how “…the Americans [meaning the majority of 
the major figures of the classical period of American philosophy], by contrast, view individuality as of paramount 
significance for morality and for social life.” 
186 John Lachs, ibid., p. 142. 
187 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface, translated by A. V. Miller, p. 27. 
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speaking of a whole as an abstract category that we can properly say that the whole retains its 
identity as constituent individuals come and go.  In truth, did it lack a jot or tittle of what it 
actually comprises, the Totality would not be what it concretely is.  Therefore, the Totality is just 
as dependent upon each individual as each individual is dependent upon the Totality.  I think that 
this important truth should comfort those who misbelieve that their lives are not significant.188  
Reality itself—one could say God—is absolutely dependent upon each and every one of us. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
 We have said that metaphysics is the discipline that deals with the most fundamental 
theoretical issues.  But we also said, in the preamble of this chapter, that a metaphysical theory 
finds its whole meaning and significance only in the context of an articulated pragmatics.  
Neither metaphysics nor pragmatics, then, can be adequately treated or understood in isolation 
from the other.  The distinction between the fundamental and the derivative is sometimes a 
useful one, but always a relative one, and we should be suspicious of any naïve foundationalism, 
of any view that claims that there are ultimately basic truths, or that claims that the relation of 
dependence among ideas only runs one way.  Metaphysics is, indeed—in a sense—the most 
fundamental theoretical discipline, and is, in this sense, the ultimate foundation of all theory.  
But this statement becomes a pernicious falsehood if it is interpreted to mean that the truths of 
metaphysics are altogether independent of other considerations.189  It is precisely this 
                                                
188 I also think that this important truth should inspire people to noble and joyful effort.  For a related discussion, see 
Nietzsche on the “greatest weight” (discussed in connection with his notion of the “eternal recurrence”. 
189 Wondering which is prior, metaphysics or pragmatics, is a little like wondering which organ of the body is more 
important, the heart or the liver.  In truth, we cannot get by for long without either one of them, or some substitute 
thereof.  The heart is afforded greater honor, and perhaps rightly so, since heart failure has more immediate 
consequences.  Even so, both are necessary for life.  Similarly, in recognizing the correlative relation between 
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perniciously false way of thinking—and the metaphysical apriorism with which it tends to be 
associated—that pushes metaphysics in the direction of irrelevancy and even meaninglessness. 
 We have emphasized throughout this work the close connections among ethics, politics, 
and soteriology.190  But how exactly should we conceive their relationship?  One way to 
understand their relationship is in terms of a hierarchy of primacy or fundamentality.  One could 
say with some justice, for instance, that ethics is properly grounded in metaphysics, and politics 
is properly grounded in ethics.  We have already illustrated, however, the ways in which politics 
is directly grounded in metaphysics.  Moreover, one could make a case for politics being more 
fundamental than ethics.191  And what of soteriology?  Should we say that soteriology must find 
its place in the hierarchy including ethics and politics, or is it better to say that soteriology must 
find its place in a different hierarchal line altogether? 
 Some progress could be made in resolving these questions by carefully defining the 
specific purview of each of the respective spheres of concern.  However, the boundaries of all of 
these spheres are naturally quite vague.  Stipulating realistic definitions with precise boundaries 
would be difficult if not impossible for any of these disciplines, and, in any event, the more 
progress that we made in the direction of precision, the more artificial and contrived our 
definitions would become.  The vagueness of the boundary between ethics and soteriology, for 
instance, is not a mark of insufficiently precise definitions or sloppy thinking; on the contrary, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
metaphysics and pragmatics, we are not recommending an inversion of the usually supposed order of dependence, 
with pragmatics assuming the fundamental role, although, for certain purposes, this too may have its utility. 
190 Although we have highlighted these three fields because of their obvious importance and centrality, we do not 
suppose that they collectively exhaust the purview of pragmatics.  Environmental philosophy, economic philosophy, 
social philosophy, feminism, queer studies, and many other traditional and contemporary fields of philosophy and 
applied ethics are properly included as well, as least in their practical aspects.  Although at least some of these, in at 
lease some of their aspects, could be subsumed under some one or combination of our principal three, this may not 
be the most convenient arrangement for all of them. 
191 One way of doing this would be to emphasize the fact that ordinary individuals, so called, are not substantial, and 
thus are not really atomic units at all.  One might then understand ordinary individuals as societies or communities of 
moments of experience, to which traditional political concerns apply. 
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registers an important truth, the truth that these spheres of concern grade into one another and 
even interdigitate.  The soteriological goal is an ethical goal (or at least includes ethical 
considerations), and vice versa.  Indeed, at a deep level, the distinction between these two 
spheres of concern tends to break down entirely.  The same can be rightly said of the other 
relationships among the different aspects of pragmatics. 
 It is for reasons of this kind that having a general category—the category that we call 
pragmatics—is useful.192  The usefulness of the notion of pragmatics is not limited to that of a 
mere verbal convenience.  Part of the point of gathering these spheres of concern under one head 
is to foster greater alliance and integration among these fields of study and practice.  Meanwhile, 
the other, more specific categories and terms subsumed by pragmatics retain their usefulness, for 
despite the considerations that we just adumbrated, there remain important differences among the 
various aspects or fields of pragmatics as well.  Collectively—as I suppose goes without 
saying—the fields of pragmatics comprise extremely important and relevant concerns for our 
time, and for any time in which there are intelligent but not yet fully enlightened beings 
struggling to know themselves and each other. 
 
                                                
192 I am not attached to this particular word.  Perhaps another would serve better for this purpose, and again, I am 
open to suggestions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
THE MEANING OF LIFE 
 
 
 
 Herman Melville’s Moby Dick is, among other things, an investigation and study of the 
meaning of life.  The story presents us with the person of Ahab, captain of the ship and, one 
might say, the central figure of the work.  Ahab has been personally affronted through the agency 
of the great whale Moby Dick.  His chief aim in life has become the exacting of vengeance upon 
the sinister brute.  Ahab projects upon Moby Dick all the evils of the world, such that to slay 
Moby Dick would be to purge at least a local concentration of this evil.  Melville makes much of 
the whiteness of the whale, saying that this whiteness makes the evil that comes in the guise of it 
all the more repugnant and terrifying. 
 Can we slay evil?  And if so, how can we do it?  Are anger and hatred of service to us in 
this endeavor?  Or is passive acceptance the best approach?  Is there a middle way?193  How, 
when, and in what way do we do battle with evil? 
 Melville has Ahab perish as a consequence of his quest, and in the process he brings most 
of the crew down with him.  Only one, Ishmael, the forsaken one, lives to tell the tale.  Is 
Melville suggesting that the path of revenge is self-destructive?  And yet he makes of Ahab 
something of a noble character.194  Ahab’s nobility comes through his relentless striving to 
                                                
193 The sense of ‘middle way’ in play here is not a mere mean: it is not the middle in the sense of halfway passive 
and halfway angry.  Rather, it is the dropping of the defective aspects of both extremes, while retaining their 
respective virtues.  I think that Lachs has something like is in mind with his notion of Stoic Pragmatism. 
194 Schopenhauer speaks in defense of vengeance in certain extreme cases.  Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation. 
 126 
destroy the cause of suffering.  His failure comes through his use of mistaken methods and his 
mistaken understanding of the nature of the case.  He unduly focused upon only his own mishap.  
He is thus a tragic figure. 
 The notion of the meaning of life is a complex notion, or an array of notions.  In one way, 
the meaning of life is a very individual and idiosyncratic thing.  In another way, the meaning of 
life is universal.  In the sense in which it is universal, the meaning of life is its cosmic 
significance.  And what is its cosmic significance?  As we have indicated, the Totality itself 
would not be what it is, were any portion of it not exactly what it is.  So the Totality itself would 
not be what it is if any individual were absent or altered.  Each individual is, therefore, absolutely 
necessary.195  It is absolutely necessary in the sense that the Totality as it is could not exist 
without it.  And the Totality itself is necessary, in that, given its reality, it cannot not exist.  What 
is the significance of this significance?  What does the knowledge of it do for us? 
 The recognition of this deep truth reveals that we are at home in reality.  And it indicates 
that we can and do make a difference to how things turn out.  The consequences of all our 
activities radiate influence onwards without cessation.  The recognition of this might be received 
as a burden, for this influence cannot be escaped—it does and must fall on each of us.196  But it 
is, in truth, a tremendous opportunity.  Our mark will be left, and it is for us to make it a good 
one, according to our capabilities, in the recognition that there is much that is not in our 
immediate control.  Therefore we can go in peace, with joyful effort. 
 Within the scope of this universal meaning of life, then, it is for each of us to find our 
own individual meaning of life.  This is an ongoing project, but there are important guiding 
principles.  Our lives are most meaningful on a personal level when we recognize their universal 
                                                
195 Contrast this insight with Hegel’s remarks on the insignificance of individuals. 
196 Cf. Nietzsche’s greatest weight. 
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meaning and consciously live in fulfillment of it.  This means that we recognize that everything 
we do has significance, since everything we do forever influences the whole future development 
of reality.  Moreover, everything we do is an eternal aspect of the Totality itself. 
 There is a traditional Mahayana Buddhist story that may be of interest in this 
connection.197  The story features Asanga, one of the most important and influential of Mahayana 
Buddhist philosophers, who is credited with founding the Yogachara or Chittamatra (Mind-
Only) School. 
 Before realizing the Mind-Only philosophy, Asanga went into retreat to seek wisdom.  
He did practice and made prayers to Buddha Maitreya (said to be the next earthly historical 
Buddha, subsequent to Buddha Shayamuni).  Asanga practiced diligently for six years, but in this 
time he had no vision of Maitreya.  Discouraged, he resigned his efforts, abandoned his practice, 
and broke his retreat.  He hiked down from his retreat cave to the nearest village.  Upon entering 
the village, he espied an old man polishing a large iron bar with a ragged cloth.  He inquired of 
the man what he was doing, and the man replied that he needed a needle to stitch his clothing, 
and was making one out of this iron bar. 
 Asanga was impressed by the man’s dedication and commitment, and humbled that he 
had not shown the same in his spiritual practice.  “Here is this ordinary man, willing to devote 
himself wholeheartedly to a task of no particularly great value, and here am I, Asanga, unwilling 
to devote even a fraction of this effort to my own noble aspiration.”  Asanga determined to return 
to retreat. 
 Another three years past, still with no sign of accomplishment.  Again Asanga, 
discouraged, gave up and broke retreat.  Again he descended from his retreat cabin, and hiked to 
                                                
197 A version of this story is recounted in Patrul Rinpoche, The Words of My Perfect Teacher, Shambhala.  Also see 
Chagdud Tulku, Gates to Buddhist Practice, Padma Publishing. 
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a village.  This time, as he entered the village, he encountered a man rubbing a cliff face with his 
bare hand.  “What are you doing?” Asanga asked.  “Oh, this cliff is obscuring the sun in the 
morning, and my house is so cold.  I am removing part of it by brushing it away with my hand.” 
 Again Asanga was impressed and humbled, and determined to return to retreat.  He 
practiced for another three years, still with no signs of accomplishment.  Discouraged, he broke 
retreat, descended, and returned to the village.  Upon entering the village, Asanga observed an 
old mother dog, severely wounded in her hindquarters, with her rear legs no longer functioning.  
The old dog was fain to drag herself along with her front legs.  Her wounds were festering and 
gangrenous, and loaded with writhing maggots.  Asanga was filled with compassion for the dog, 
and moved to comfort her.  The dog, in her fear and pain, snapped and snarled at Asanga.  
Asanga knew that he had to clean the wound if the dog were to have any chance of survival. 
 Asanga first had to remove the maggots from the wound.  But he did not want to harm 
the maggots, and was at a loss for a time as to how to proceed.  He at lasted determined to cut off 
a piece of his own flesh as food for the maggots, and then to lick the maggots out of the wound 
with his tongue, so as not to injure them.  Asanga cut off the piece of his flesh, and held it near 
the wounded dog’s hindquarters.  The thought of licking the festering wound repulsed him.  He 
closed his eyes and held his breath, and lowered his head.  Feeling his tongue touch the earth, he 
opened his eyes. 
 The dog was gone, and instead, sitting to the side, was Maitreya.  Overcome with 
astonishment and joy, Asanga prostrated before him.  He then addressed Maitreya: “Why did you 
wait so long to come to me?  For twelve years I dedicated my practice to you, and never did you 
show yourself.” 
 129 
 Maitreya replied: “I have been with you all the time.  I was there with you in your retreat 
cave, but you did not see me.  I was the old man polishing the large iron bar with a ragged cloth.  
I was the man rubbing the cliff face with my bare hand.  However, it was only when I appeared 
to you as this poor wretched dog and you were spontaneously moved to action by pure 
compassion and love that you were able to see me.” 
 Asanga was skeptical.  “Put me on your shoulder,” Maitreya replied, “and carry me 
around and show me to others.”  Asanga did as he was instructed.  With each person he met, the 
result was the same: puzzled, they all replied that they could see nothing on his shoulder. 
 Finally, Asanga encountered an old woman renowned for her compassion, and said to 
have some realization.  “Do you see anything on my shoulder?” Asanga asked. 
 “Yes,” she said.  “You are carrying the corpse of an old mother dog.”198 
 The point, in the present context, or one of the points, is that often our efforts take some 
time to show fruit.  Moreover, they will not always be recognized and appreciated by others.  
Even so, progress is made.  Indeed, we cannot help but to make an impact on the world.  This 
impact becomes an eternal feature of reality.  It also continues to ripple forward without end.  Let 
it be in rings of benefit. 
 
                                                
198 On the mythic (or teaching) significance of stories of this kind, see Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth. 
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